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My city, like cities around the country, is divided in two. 
The center of power that is Washington sits next to the 
disenfranchised in the District of Columbia. Everyone 
knows "official Washington" with its marble, 
monuments, and malls. But the "other Washington" has 
been off-limits to the blue-and-white tour buses and to 
the consciousness of the rest of America. 
Here are substandard tenements instead of stately 
government offices. Here children play in rat-infested 
back alleys strewn with glass, trash, and syringes instead 
of running in beautiful parks. Here the only monuments 
are to neglect, indifference, and the stranglehold of 
entrenched racism on the city that proclaims itself a 
beacon of freedom to the world. 
Here the homeless huddle in the shadows of the 
houses of great state power, trying to stay warm by 
sleeping on the grates that expel hot air from the heating 
systems of the Pentagon, the White House, the halls of 
Congress, and the Department of Justice. The wet heat 
combined with the cold winter air can produce 
pneumonia, and the pattern of the iron grates can be 
seen on the burned flesh of the unfortunate who fall into 
a deep sleep. Those who work in the government 
building from which the New World Order is run must 
literally step over the homeless as they go to their offices. 
The symbolism is obvious, and the everyday scene is a 
striking metaphor of the world economic order. 
Reverend Jim Wallis 
Excerpt from: The Soul Of Politics: Beyond "Religious 












This research explores the liabilities and possibilities of African regionalism in an 
emerging international system characterized by economic globalization. The paper 
concerns itself with understanding the ways in which scholars are conceiving the 
concept of globalization, determining the ways in which the phenomenon is 
impacting the international system, and discerning globalization's impact on 
political and economic outcomes in Africa. The paper argues that globalization is 
driving the establishment of a global free market capitalist economic system based 
on competition, efficiency and productivity. This emerging international political 
economic order increasingly favours economies of scale and collective capacity. 
That is, its organizational logic is such that only those competitors who can 
rapidly mobilize and deploy vast resources across a range of domains will be able 
to compete effectively in the system. Accordingly, the wealthy areas of the globe 
are organizing themselves into increasingly cohesive economic and political 
regional groupings. Furthermore, globalization is speeding the inclusion of poorer 
countries into this fiercely competitive market. However, the terms of inclusion 
are dictated by and in favor of the wealthiest and most powerful members of the 
international society. Based on this reading of international life the paper argues 
that more pervasive cooperation and integration is ultimately Africa's only viable 
development strategy. African regionalism is examined in historical perspective 
an assessment of past initiatives, which it is now clear have largely faltered, yields 
the conclusion that a fundamental strategic re-orientation is required. The 
constitutional, 'grand-strategy' approach to integration must give way to an 
orientation that emphasizes more functional economic connections below the level 
of the state. Thus, this paper advocates the gradual and incremental enlargement 
of the area of cooperation across political and economic domains within and 
across regions on a functional basis. The establishment of an African Free Trade 
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The pace of global change has accelerated considerably in the last decades of the Twentieth 
century. At the tum of the millennium we are confronted by the rapid emergence of new 
paradigms in international life. The Westphalian order!, characterized by rigid territoriality 
and staunch self-interest, is declining. The nation-state is no longer the sole determinant of 
international life. Powerful non-state actors -- transnational corporations, inter-governmental 
institutions, and international terrorist/liberation organizations -- are increasingly shaping the 
geopolitical landscape. Simultaneous processes of fragmentation and integration are at work, 
resulting in the dissolution of some large state entities into autonomous republics and 
enclaves, at the same time as others are becoming increasingly economically and politically 
inter-connected. The military and ideological competition that has largely characterized 
human historical development no longer monopolizes the international agenda. Economic 
considerations are increasingly becoming the alpha of international life. 
These changes speak to shifts in the character, tenor and modus operandi of the international 
system. A phenomenon most often referred to as globalization is at its heart. At the most 
fundamental level this phenomenon marks a global intensification of human interaction across 
economic, political, social and cultural space. In the process globalization is thoroughly 
transforming states, cultures and civilizations. Thus far its economic dimensions have been 
most pronounced. A loose combination of trade agreements and integration of financial 
markets is uniting the world into a single, lucrative, but brutally competitive marketplace. The 
I The notion of the nation-state dates back to the 1648 Westphalian peace pact in which the major European 
actors agreed to the limitation of power to defined geographical territories. The nation-state became constituted 
of sovereign territorial boundaries, controlled autonomously from the centres, and safeguarded from intervention 










logic of the emerging order dictates the empowerment of the wealthy and disenfranchisement 
of the poorest areas of the world. 
Africa, perhaps more than any other region, faces the danger of permanent marginalization. 
The continent is challenged by problems that are inextricably connected -- violent conflict and 
civil strife, economic crisis, desperate poverty, unprecedented population growth, 
environmental degradation, and crisis of leadership. In economic terms Africa finds itself 
'out-competed' in international markets, even by other developing regions. Global recession 
and generally depressed international markets for primary export products continue to stifle 
Africa's export-oriented development drive. In the process African countries have been forced 
to accept worsening terms of trade for fear of complete exclusion from international economic 
activity. For the rest of the world Africa remains the source of oil and scarce, non-renewable 
resources. At a time when serious competition on international markets necessitates 
economies of scale and collective capacity, many scholars predict that Africa will be unable to 
build its own economic bloc or to alleviate some of the worst crises through inter-regional 
trade. They suggest that African countries are simply too poor and their political and social 
structures too weak and unstable for regionalism to be a viable project. Although the danger 
ofthe continent's designation to perpetual irrelevance is clearly present, certain possibilities 
do exist for successful African regionalism. Such possibilities are contingent upon a renewed 
and genuine commitment to cooperation and integration on the part of African leaders, as well 











Establishing the Research Parameters 
This research, then, enters the highly contested arena of African political-economic 
development. Two critical concepts -- globalization and regional integration -- serve as the 
analytical focal points. 
The paper sets out the following argument: 
The international system is undergoing rapid and unprecedented change. Globalization, 
particularly in its economic facets, is the engine of this change. The phenomenon is dictating 
the organizational logic of the international political-economy. Three broad elements of this 
organizational logic are already discernible: 
1. The powerful/wealthy are establishing the character, priorities and values of the emerging 
world order. These priorities and values are a global free market economic system based 
on competition, efficiency and productivity; 
2. Globalization processes are speeding the evolution of a single, lucrative, but brutally 
competitive global market. Alternatively stated, globalization processes are dramatically 
extending the reach and depth of the international political-economy. In the process, many 
poorer countries are being drawn further into the global economic system, but the terms of 
inclusion are dictated by and in favor of the wealthy_ Others face the specter of exclusion 
from economic activity; 
3. International markets increasingly favor the economics of scale and collective capacity. 
That is, competitors with the greatest capacity (those that can instantaneously mobilize 
vast resources and/or coordinate economic strategy across a range of domains) will 
ultimately be the only ones able to compete. Accordingly, prosperous regions are striving 











These three characteristics are resulting in the simultaneous ==== and subordination of 
African countries in the international political-economy. In order to survive these 
globalization processes African states must harness their collective capacities far more 
effectively. Therefore, more pervasive regional cooperation, and ultimately integration, is the 
continent's development panacea. 
The paper argues for a fundamental re-assessment of African cooperation and integration 
initiatives. It advocates a strategic re-orientation - away from the 'macro' or constitutional 
approaches to integration that have brought little success over the past twenty-five years, to 
strategies that prioritize functional economic relationships below the level of the state. Such a 
functional orientation is compatible and consistent with the establishment of an African Free 
Trade Area. 
Hence, the questions to which this research addresses itself are: 
• How are scholars conceiving the concept of globalization? 
• How is globalization shaping political and economic outcomes in the international arena? 
• What are the consequences of globalization on Third World nations, and African countries 
in particular? 
• As a strategy to negotiate the threats posed by globalization processes, what are the 
possibilities and liabilities of regional integration in Africa? 
• Do useful theoretical guidelines exist to infonn our thinking about regionalism in Africa? 













This research is organized in two parts. Part I interrogates the concept of globalization, 
exploring the ways in which the phenomenon is transforming the international system and 
what effect this is having on the developing world in general and on African nations in 
particular. The first section examines competing definitions of globalization. The second 
outlines the nature and state of the discourse on globalization. Four markers are identified in 
this debate: the question of globalization's conceptualization as a force of integration or 
fragmentation is treated; single versus multi-causal analyses of globalization are examined; 
the question of whether globalization is a purposive agenda is considered; and, the heated 
contest over whether globalization should be understood as a detrimental or beneficial force is 
explored. The third section outlines the political-economic outcomes attributable to 
globalization. Finally, the implications of political and economic aspects of globalization 
specifically on Africa are examined. The assessment centers on four broad issues the 
continent's geographic and strategic isolation, the record of global capitalism vis a vis Africa, 
the co-option of the African elite, and the connection between globalization and World Bank 
and IMF-sponsored Structural Adjustment Programs. 
Systemic diagnosis gives way to a regional focus. The second part of the paper assesses the 
possibilities and liabilities of regional integration in Africa, as the vehicle for negotiating the 
changing international political-economic terrain. The first section of Part II clarifies the 
central concepts of integration and regionalism. The second briefly outlines the specific 
economic imperatives that make the case for regional cooperation and integration in Africa. 
The third section canvasses twenty-five years of cooperation and integration initiatives on the 











been explored, as well as the ambitious project of market integration and the formation of an 
African Common Market. In this historical overview the obstacles, impediments and 
problems of regional integration initiatives in Africa begin to emerge. The following section 
treats these more explicitly under four broad headings: logistical considerations, institutional 
proliferation and deficiencies, political-ideological factors, and external dependence. This 
contextualises the subsequent examination of Functionalism as a possible theoretical 
antecedent for more viable regional integration initiatives. Section five outlines 
functionalism's own antecedents and central propositions, examines the critical role of 
interest politics in functional thinking, identifies the neo-Functionalist modifications to the 
theory, and finally assesses its adaptability to the African context. The sixth section draws 
important lessons from Europe's integration experiences, particularly where they are 
instructive to Africa. The final section is prescriptive, outlining certain prospects and 
possibilities for the continent. This section focuses on the idea of an African Free Trade Area 
as an alternative, or precursor, to an African Common Market. 
Strategy 
This research adopts four notable strategic provisions. First, it moves between two distinct 
levels of analysis. It commences by interrogating globalization in so doing it adopts a 
systemic level of analysis. The subsequent exploration of regional integration shifts the paper 
from a systemic to a regional focus. This strategy is grounded in the conviction that a rigorous 
appreciation of the African regional integration problematic is contingent on a broader 












Secondly, it is important to stress that the intention of this research is not to provide a policy 
blueprint for African regionalism. Rather, based on a close reading of systemic developments, 
and by understanding where past efforts of African regionalism have faltered and collapsed, 
as well as by drawing on the experiences of other regions, particularly Europe, this research 
sets up an "ideal type" intended as a theoretical guideline to more rigorous future policy 
formation. 
Thirdly, this research purposefully argues Africa. That is to say, the analysis chooses to treat 
Africa in its geographic entirety. The validity of such an approach is a continuous source of 
tension amongst Africanist scholars. Some argue that the great diversity of political, economic, 
cultural and social conditions across the continent render the concept of 'Africa' analytically 
useless. By no means does this research wish to undermine or invalidate the tremendous 
diversity of circumstances and experiences that so obviously exist. It does, however, aspire to 
transcend some of these, in the process making macroMlevel generalizations that may prove 
relevant for micro-level policy formation in differing contexts. It is indisputable that certain 
experiences transcend political, economic, social and cultural particularities. It is clear that 
certain transMcontinental common strands - philosophical, historical, cultural, political and 
economic - do exist. These 'unify' Africa. The continent's colonial history and heritage is a 
case in point. The experience of colonial domination has had certain consequences and 
repercussions that traverse the continent from North to South. One of the lines of argument 
implicitly pursued in this paper is that colonialism has resulted in certain political-economic 
distortions that negatively impact the ability of all African countries to compete on 
international markets. African nations face similar constraints and obstacles when trying to 
make headway in international system. Thus, the challenges faced by Kenya in competing on 











mechanisms, etc) in some respects approximate obstacles faced by Algeria, Ghana or Zambia. 
Therefore, where research engages in systemic analysis and aspires to establish a theoretical 
framework a degree of generalization is both possible and useful. 
Finally, this research adopts a political-economic framework of analysis. As an analytical tool 
political economy aspires to narrow the gap between the political and economic realms. There 
is an increasing awareness within the respective disciplines of the urgent need to integrate the 
study of international economics and international politics to attain a deeper understanding of 
the forces and phenomena at work in the world. The inter-disciplinary distinction between 
politics and economics has been more an expression of analytical necessity than an accurate 
approximation of reality. The disciplinary specialization is both understandable and 
justifiable. Social reality must be broken down into 'pieces' that we are able to wrap our 
minds around in order for theory to progress. However, at some point these pieces must be 
integrated for an appreciation of the broader terrain. Thus, to borrow from one of the 
definitive works in political economy, to understand the "totality of political and economic 
reality" necessitates the integration of individual pieces into a "larger theoretical framework 
of political economy". 2 
The concept 'political-economy' is a vexed one in the political science discipline. Different 
scholars assign it significantly different designations. This paper draws its understanding of 
the concept from several sources. Robert Gilpin, Roger Tooze and others, use the teml 
political economy to denote a set of questions generated by the interaction of political and 
economic activities. These questions can be examined using any theoretical and 
2 Robert Gilpin, (1987), The Political Economy OfInternationai Relations, Princeton: Princeton University 











methodological means deemed appropriate.3 Robert Gilpin's analysis in ..!..!!~~~!! 
Economy of International Relations, reflects an eclectic mixture of analytical methods and 
theoretical perspectives to address these questions. 
F or Martin Staniland, as a field of study political economy describes "how politics determines 
aspects of the economy, and how economic institutions determine the political process," as 
wen as "the dynamic interaction between the two forces.,,4 This definition also stresses an 
intimate connection between politics and economics. It has been pointed out by numerous 
scholars that political scientists have tended to neglect the role of markets in their analysis of 
international life, whereas economists often ignore the political context of events and in 
particular the central importance of power. As a consequence both parties have often seen only 
the partial picture. In his description of the nature of political economy Gilpin states that "the 
parallel existence and mutual interaction of' state' and 'market' in the modern world create 
'political economy' ... ,,5 By stipulating the rules that govern economic behavior and by 
determining the distribution of property rights the state profoundly influences the outcome of 
market activities. And, the market as a pre-eminent source of power greatly influences political 
outcomes. 
Further, political economy denotes the "reciprocal and dynamic interaction in international 
relations of the pursuit of wealth and the pursuit of power"6 Gilpin defines the concept of 
political economy by treating discreetly 'politics' and 'economics'. For him the relationship 
between politics and economics translates into that between power and wealth. In his language, 
3 See: Roger Tooze, (1984), "Perspectives and Theory: A Consumer's Guide," in Strange, ed. (1984b), -'-==-=-'" 
International Political Economy, London: George Allen and Unwin. 
4 Martin Staniland, What is Political Economy? New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1985, p. 6. 
5 Gilpin (1987), p. 8. 
6 Robert Gilpin, (1975), U.S. Power And The Multinational Corporation: The Political Economy Of Foreign 











"economics takes as its province the creation and distribution of wealth; politics is the realm of 
power." And, both power and wealth is the capacity to produce certain results. 7 He defines 
wealth as anything (capital, land or labour) that can generate future income; it is composed of 
physicaJ assets and human capital (including embodied knowledge). Gilpin stresses that the 
distinction between politics as the science of power and economics as the science of wealth is 
essentially an analytical one, and that in the real world power and wealth are inseparable. 
Simply put, in the realm of international affairs it is difficult to detennine where economics end 
and politics begin. As already stated, our delineation between the two within the academy has 
enabled us to wrap our minds around certain complex phenomena; but in our separation our 
macro-perspe,ctive is often impaired. Thus, in the effort to understand more fully systemic 
interactions this research chooses to adopt an analytical framework that recognizes the intimate 
interconnections and aspires to treat economic and political phenomena simultaneously. 












TOWARDS AN UNDERSTANDING OF GLOBALIZATION 
A new world war has begun, but now it is against humanity as a whole, in the name 
of 'globalization '. This modern war assassinates and forgets ... As in all world wars 
what is at stake is a new division of the world. This new division of the world 
consists of increasing the power of the powerful and the misery of the miserable. 
Salvadore Marcos 
sub-Commander, Zapatista National Liberation Front, Mexico. 
Globalization is a positive development for the world economy ... to begin 
globalization is the continuation of the trend of growing openess and integration 
among economies that has brought the world a half century of unparalleled 
prosperity. 
Michael Camdessus 
Managing Director, International Monetary Fund 
Anyone who believes that globalization can be stopped has to tell us how he would 
envision stopping economic and technological progress; this is tantamount to trying 
to stop the rotation of the earth. 
Renato Ruggiero 











The globalization debate is the site of heated contestation. The high degree of non-consensus 
amongst participants is partially a consequence of the extreme politicization of the debate. For 
some, most often voices from the developing world, globalization represents a grave threat to 
the survival of the poor in the international system. Proponents view globalization as a 
positive phenomenon that is fostering greater interconnectivity and bringing global prosperity 
in its wake. Many choose to evaluate more evenly the ways in which globalization is affecting 
societies, structures and systems. The meeting point of the diverse options, perspectives, 
evaluations, diagnoses and warnings that characterize the discourse, seems to be a common 
recognition that as a phenomenon globalization is truly universal- it touches every society 
and individual on the planet. The first part of the paper enters the globalization discourse by 
examining how scholars are conceiving the concept, by identifYing the principal nodes of 
contestation in the debate, and by exploring the political economic consequences of the 
phenomenon and particularly its implications for Africa. 
1. CONCEPTUAL CLARI}<ICATIONS: 
TRANSNATIONAL LIFE, WORLD ORDER AND GLOBALIZATION 
Transnational Life 
Transnational life signifies the interaction of people, states, and non-state actors who 
influence processes and change beyond national boundaries. Non-state actors include inter-
governmental organizations such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the 
United Nations (UN), and non-governmental institutions and organizations such as 
Greenpeace and the Catholic Church; transnational corporations; as well as other entities such 











international system encompasses all the relationships amongst these states and actors. 
Theorists often distinguish four prominent subsystems within the international system: the 
economic, the political, the cultural, and the ecological system. 
World Order 
As with many critical concepts within the discipline of political science, problems abound in 
defining world or global order. Some of this difficulty is semantic, for there is always some 
kind of order or pattern in the international system, whether it is actually orderly or not. 
Therefore, whether the world order is stable, lawful or violent, there is always some sort of 
pattern of forces and relationships that determine how the critical decisions are made in 
international society. Hedley Bull characterizes world order as "a pattern of activity that 
sustains the elementary or primary goals of the society of states or international society."s 
The political-economist Mihaly Simai leans on Bull's formulation, making distinction 
between a broad and narrow definition of world order. The former he views as the "totality of 
globally valid norms, rules and international codes of conduct designed for, and generally 
observed by, states and transnational actors in international public policy making processes". 
The narrower understanding of global order he defines as "the entirety of legally binding 
norms and institutions that regulate international relations.,,9 Other definitions characterize 
global order as rule oflaw, collective responsibility and mutual accountability among actors 
within the international system." The 'rules' and 'norms' which Simai referres to largely 
regulate the manner in which the subsystems of the international system operate. It must be 
noted that they are most often based on the values and priorities of the dominant powers 
8 Hedley Bull, (1977), The Anarchical Society: A Study Of Order In World Politics, New York: Columbia 
University Press, p. 8. 
9 Mihaly Simai, (1994), The Future Of Global Governance: Managing Risk And Change In The International 











within the system. Another important characteristic of global order, then, is that the powerful 
set its tone and character. 
Globalization 
Globalization in general can be described as a social process of intensifying the relations 
between the different parts of the world. Geographical limits for human action become less 
and less significant. From a less objective point of view globalization can also be seen as the 
imposition of Western culture and economic system on the rest of the world. The usual 
manner in which the emergence of globalization is seen is as a relatively recent phenomenon, 
issuing with the era of a growing service economy, post-modernization, and the 
reorganization of capitalist structures. On the other hand one could argue that the roots of 
globalization can be traced back to the 16th century when economic activity began to 
systematize, international relations between states were deepened, and a "global culture" 
began to emerge. Other theories, especially Marxist orientated ones, insist that globalization 
has been co-temporal with modernization in the beginning of the 20th century and with 
emerging industrialization. 
Although there is no apparent consensus on when the process of globalization began, what 
seems clear is that its manifestation as a discourse of analysis and explanation has begun to 
crystallize only over the past few decades. Out of myriad instances certain events and 
phenomena seem to stand out as symbolic of globalization: the increasing interconnectedness 
of people and information throughout the world, and the end of colonialism and collapse of 
communism. The subsequent ascendancy and dissemination of universal ideologies such as 











emerging world order. By transforming modes of political and economic organization and 
impacting cultures and civilizations, globalization is forcing us to re-evaluate our fundamental 
conceptions oftbe workings of the world. 
Anthony McGrew, in his essay "A Global Society," provides a concise two-part definition of 
the concept: globalization refers to the "multiplicity of linkages and interconnections that 
transcend nation-states, and societies which currently make up the modern world system.,,10 
Notably, this formulation runs counter to neo-realist conceptions of the state, and a broader 
regional or civilization conception (Samuel Huntington being a most vociferous protagonist of 
the latter). For McGrew, globalization defines a process through which events, decisions, and 
activities in one part of the world can come to have significant consequences for individuals 
and communities in quite distant parts of the globe. 
McGrew's definition relies on the fdrmulations of two theorists -- Anthony Giddens and 
David Harvey -- the first a respected macro-social theorist and the second a pioneering post-
modernist. Giddens characterizes globalization as the trend toward "time/space distanciation" 
or the "intersection of presence and absence." Simplified, this implies that local circumstances 
have less of a hold on people's lives, and more distant circumstances gain importance. 
Giddens writes, "social relations and interactions are not dependent upon physical presence, 
as the institutions of modem societies, facilitated by instantaneous communication, foster 
intense relations between 'absent' others, locationally distant from any given situation of face 
to face interaction". II In contrast, Harvey focuses on a "time/space compression" which 
translates to the sense that people have that the world has become smaller. Harvey argues that 
since the 1960s this time/space compression "has had a disorienting and disruptive impact on 
10 Anthony McGrew, (1992). "A Global Society?" In Hall, S., D. Held & A. McGrew (Eds.). Modernity and its 










political and economic practices, the balance of class power, as well as upon cultural and 
sociallife." 12 
McGrew effectively reduces Harvey and Giddens' formulations into two more parsimonious 
theoretical dimensions -- scope and intensity. As human social activities are "stretched" 
across the globe (scope), our interactions and interconnectedness become intensified. Thus, 
McGrew's definition intimates the existence of an order or process that transcends the nation 
states and their interaction, and plays an increasingly important role in cultural, political, 
economic and social outcomes the world over. 
Ruud Lubbers articulates an interesting paradox of the globalization phenomenon: 
When people are asked when they first heard the word "globalization," 
most of them are unable to answer. "Not all that long ago," they will say. 
This is because the notion of globalization has only recently gained 
currency, which makes it itself an instance of globalization. 
Lubbers defines globalization as, <4a technologically and ideologically driven process in which 
geographic distance becomes irrelevant for socio-cultural, political and economic relations". 13 
He suggests that the end of the Cold War marked the beginning of political globalization. For 
him, politics since 1945 had been strongly influenced by the tri-partition of the world: the first 
world, also known as the free world; the second world comprising the communist states; and 
the third world, comprising the developing countries, also often referred to as non-aligned 
states. With the disappearance of the second world, the concept of 'non-aligned countries' lost 
its frame of reference. The fact that particularly the economies of the Pacific Rim were 
II Giddens in McGrew, p. 66. 











experiencing tremendous economic development called into serious question the validity of 
treating the non-aligned countries as a homogeneous group. Now that this tri-partition has 
been dissolved most countries seem to be opting for a combination of free-market economic 
principles and democratic modes of political organization. The package, most commonly 
referred to as Liberal Democracy, speaks to an underlying process of political globalization. 
Furthermore, Lubbers believes one can speak of technological globalization -- globalization 
of and especially by means of information technology. Thirdly, economic globalization, 
which has had the most profound effect on peoples, cultures and societies, has resulted in a 
world economy characterized by, among other things, increased trade, mutual dependency, a 
great deal of global sourcing, and a worldwide capital market. These three facets of 
globalization are mutually reinforcing one another. 
Despite the fact that no definitional consensus can be discerned many scholars agree that four 
broad characteristics are most often associated with the globalization process. The first is the 
rapid spread of information through technological innovations. Second, globalization has been 
characterized by the expansion of transnational corporate activity. Third, it is marked by the 
multiplicity of linkages and interpenetration of states and societies. And fourth, globalization 
presents a challenge to the concept of the nation state. 
From a theoretical standpoint the significance of these conceptions is that they challenge 
virtually every social science narrative in existence, whether Marxian or Market. They carry 
the tacit implication that the mental maps with which we have been charting human 
development are outdated. Understanding global order involves extending the mind beyond 
immediate encounters between people and nation-states in a way that we are largely 











unaccustomed to. It is no longer adequate to view the world from the localized context of 
one's own society or region. There is an increasing pressure for 'global consciousness' -- that 
is to say, an awareness of one's position in relation to others in the international society. 
Given the conceptual paradigm shift the intellectual ferment that is the globalization 
discourse, is hardly surprising 
2. THE STATE OF THE GLOBALIZATION DISCOURSE 
Within the discourse on globalization numerous scholars and intellectuals offer theories 
conceptualizing the phenomenon and its impact on the future. Although many of these make a 
valuable contribution to an area of scholarship very much in its infancy, the actual scope and 
complexity of globalism precludes the possibility of its explanation by a single theory. The 
difficulty inherent in the generation of an all-encompassing theory is rooted in the mobility of 
the concept. Globalization travels everywhere -- across all academic disciplines; it traverses 
cultures; it is evident in the television programs that we tune into (Baywatch is the most 
watched show in the world!); it manifests itself on supermarket shelves in the products we 
find 'indispensable' (like Gillette razor blades and Pringles potato chips). In a practical sense, 
therefore, globalization is everywhere and means everything. Yet, precisely because of its 
mobility, breadth and depth it remains conceptually difficult to locate. The numerous and 
animated contests within the globalization debate are partially a reflection of this peculiarity. 











Integration vs. Fragmentation 
The intellectual activity focused on globalization can be understood as a spectrum of ideas 
ranging from the belief that globalization is leading to increased fragmentation on the one 
end, to predictions of the emergence of a one-world society on the other. Howard Perlmutter, 
in his essay "On the Rocky Road to the First Global Civilization," adopts a one-world 
analytical perspective. Perlmutter envisions a world of increased interconnectedness, 
underpinned by cooperation and respect for difference: "the possibility exists of the 
emergence of one single world civilization with great diversity in its constituent cultures and 
interdependence among poles. ,,14 He cites the political, economic, cultural and technological 
arenas as spheres that increasingly connect people, such that local events are played out on a 
global stage. In similar vein, Modelski observes that extensive patterns of global interaction 
and global awareness, combined with the deepening of universal values like 
environmentalism and human rights point to the emergence of a world society. lSI In contrast, 
Robert Gilpin suggests that globalization is resulting in increased fragmentation. He warns 
against confusing the physical unification of the globe with moral unity: "the human species 
remains deeply divided by race, religion and wealth,,16 James Rosenau's conception of a 
bifurcated world society, consisting simultaneously of the interaction between states and 
multifarious organizations, groups and individuals, finds some middle ground between these 
opposing viewpoints. Rosenau contends that the state-centric and multi-centric forces are the 
key actors in global tensions simultaneously moving towards change and struggling for 
continuity. For Rosenau, "this nexus ofthe two worlds is a prime arena wherein clashes 
occur between the past and the present, between the tendencies towards decentralization and 
14 Howard Perlmutter, (1991), "On the Rocky Road to the First Global Civilization," Human Relations, vol. 44, 
no. 9, p. 103. 
15 Modelski, in McGrew, 1992, p. 65. 











those towards centralization.,,17 All three perspectives essentially outline how globalization is 
reconstituting the world and essentially diluting the primacy of the nation-state in the 
international system. 
Multi vs. Single-Causal Analyses 
Two broad methodological camps can be discerned in the discourse on globalization. The first 
supports single causes as the primary engines of globalization; the other cites many 
interrelated forces. Wallerstein, Rosenau and Gilpin provide single causal analyses of the 
driving forces of the globalization process. Wallerstein is primarily concerned with the 
centrality of capitalism: "the entire globe is operating within the framework of this singular 
social division of labour we are calling the capitalist world economy."i8 Wallerstein and 
others I9 argue that the dissemination of capitalism throughout the world is resulting in 
distorted and unequal power dynamics within and between states. Furthermore, global 
capitalism reinforces economic interdependence while simultaneously provoking resistance 
on a global scale. Capitalism has acquired a global reach, particularly since the collapse of 
communism and the command economy ethic. Wallerstein suggests that the capitalist global 
economy fosters extreme inequalities in access to power and wealth, and thus "embraces both 
processes of global integration and fragmentation". 20 
Where Wallerstein cites capitalism as the engine of globalization, Rosenau gives primacy to 
technology: "it is technology, in short, that has fostered the interdependence of local, national 
17 James Rosenau, (1990), p. 109. 
18 McGrew, 1992, p. 70. 
19 See for example, Arjun Mhakijani (1992), From Global Capitalism To Economic Justice: An Inquiry Into The 
Elimination Of Systemic Poverty, Violence And Environmental Destruction In The World Economy. New York: 
The Apex Press. 











and international communities that is far greater than any previous experience.,,21 For 
Rosenau technology speeds up global change at political and economic levels. The recent and 
rapid expansion of media and mass communications, for instance, has facilitated 
unprecedented global political and economic change. The argument follows that autocratic 
regimes that perpetrate violence against their own citizens are increasingly unable to insulate 
themselves against international censure because they are less able to censor information and 
images of atrocities committed. The world at large has become privy to local circumstances. 
J.L. Comaroff comments: 
Global communications have seriously subverted the control previously 
exercised by states and regimes over flows of information -- and the forms 
of power accrued to them as a result. Moreover, nationalistic media are no 
longer the sole arbiters and vehicles of ideologically filtered news. Nor, in 
the 1990s, are they the uncontested mechanisms by which the nation is 
narrated, its deep horizontal comradeship conjured up. Planetary flows of 
words and images are eating away at the borders of the commonwealth of 
signs that once (more or less) enclosed nation-states.22 
Thus, technological aspects of globalization are rendering the nation-state more transparent 
and impinging on its capacity to conduct business autonomously. 
Gilpin argues that the globalization process is primarily influenced by political factors. For 
him, this is mainly a result of the continued capacity of the nation-state to foster stable 
interaction between states. He suggests that globalization is a "historically contingent process; 
contingent in the sense that it relies upon hegemonic states in the international system to 
impose a form of world order which fosters interaction, openness, cooperation and 
21 Rosenau, 1990, p. 17. 











interdependence.,,23 A tension exists in Gilpin's argument in that he simultaneously places 
primacy on the power of the state, and emphasizes the central role of hegemonic power. The 
presence of strong hegemonic blocs erodes the capacity of self-detennination of states 
(particularly weaker ones). 
Globalization as a Purposive Agenda? 
Is globalization to be conceptualized as a process with its own logic and volition, which is 
beyond the immediate control of actors, agents and institutions? Is it to be viewed as an 
explicit and purposive agenda that is, at the very least, partially directed by power players in 
the international system? Or, is it to be understood as a process with independent volition and 
a purposive agenda simultaneously at work? Those who view globalization as a phenomenon 
with a momentum of its own often invoke the logic of capitalism to support their position. 
Their starting point is the identification of economic globalization as a new feature of 
capitalism. Capitalism, as an economic system based on generation of profit, has an inherent 
logic. This logic dictates, for example, that a vast network of investors (referred to as 'the 
market') will divest funds from one economy at the prospect of generating greater profits in 
another. The market does not respond to an invidious corporate elite, or even directly to the 
international economic institutions. In the first instance it responds to the basic logic of 
capitalism.24 On the other hand, the starting point for those that view globalization as a 
purposive agenda is a broad understanding of the effects of economic globalization on the 
international system. As this paper argues, economic globalization is resulting in the creation 
of a single, brutally competitive market that favours those actors with the greatest capacity to 
23 McGrew, 1992, p. 71. 
24 For an argument along these lines see: Andrew Schmidt, (1999), "Macroeconomic Policy: Where the Idea and 
the Practice of Democracy is Contested and Constructed," seminar paper presented to the Department of 











mobilize resources, to the severe detriment of less powerful actors. Thus, imposed 
conditionalities by certain international economic institutions (specifically those contained in 
Structural Adjustment Programs) which advocate more pervasive integration of developing 
countries into the international political economy in a position of subordination, must be 
understood in the context of globalization as a purposive agenda that ensures that the winners 
in the international system remain as such.25 
A Detrimental and/or Beneficial Process? 
The acute politicization of the debate is most evident in the heated contest over whether 
globalization should be viewed as a positive or negative force of global change. In his 
controversial book, The End Of History And The Last Man, Francis Fukuyama argues that 
globalization is bringing in its wake liberal democracy and must be viewed as beneficial for 
mankind. Fukuyama's fundamental argument is that globalization is driving a universal 
human historical process that is purposive, directional and unilinear, and has a discernible end 
point. Liberal democracy marks the end of the historical process because this mode of 
organization best satisfies the key elements of the human personality -- rationality, desire and 
h . . 26 t ymotlc emotlOn. 
Fukuyama proposes that we have reached the end of the historical process. At this final 
25 The connection between Structural Adjustment Programmes and economic globalization is explored further in 
a subsequent section. 
26 Thymos is coined by Plato, who saw the human soul as composed of three parts, one desiring, another rational, 
and a third thymotic part. Fukuyama translatcs thymos as "spiritedness". He suggests that it is the innate human 
sense of justice and right, the psychological seat of aspects of the human character such as self-lessness & self-
sacrifice, honor, morality, respect, idealism and courage. It is the guiding element in the process of valuation and 
self-valuation. Thymos allows people to feel anger when they feel that their sense of self-worth has been 
undervalued. It also allows people to feel angry about what they perceive as injustices against other human 
beings. Fukuyama introduces thymos as a historical reference point in his explanation of the characteristics of 











moment in history the liberal democratic system has emerged as the optimal mode of human 
organization. Fukuyama qualifies his use of the term "history" by stressing that the process 
has not ended because human events have ceased to occur, but because the great inter-
ideological battles have been fought and liberal democracy has emerged as the most 
functional and "satisfYing" system for human development. In Fukuyama's words, "liberal 
democracy may constitute the end point of mankind's ideological evolution. ,,27 Liberal 
democracy has emerged as the victor because in its ideal form it is supposedly free of the 
massive internal contradictions that have been the undoing of other forms of government. 
Future battles will be fought within the frame ofliberal democracy. Fukuyama envisions an 
increasing number of states being brought into the liberal democratic fold, and those nations 
in which rudimentary structures of liberal democracy already exist will struggle to further 
develop and refine their institutions. 
Fukuyama argues that "a universal consumer culture now beckons all peoples of the world 
alike, and no underdeveloped region is shut out from the prospect ofbounty,,?8 He cites the 
example of Japan's phenomenal economic success as testament to the policies of full 
integration into the global capitalist system under free-market principles. In Fukuyama's 
words, it has enabled Japan to "create unimagined amounts of new wealth".29 Similarly, Bill 
Warren also maintains that economic globalization benefits poor nations: "Alliances with 
foreign capital has established conditions for indigenous capital accumulation. Indigenous 
hand in hand with the human desire for economic and physical security. Therefore, economic activity and 
political life is a combination of the workings of desire and thymas. [Fukuyama, (1992), p. 171] 
27 Francis Fukuyama, 1992, The End Of History And The Last Man. New York: A von Books, p. ix. 
28 Fukuyama in P. Anderson, (1992), A Zone Of Engagement, New York: Verso Press, p. 343. 











capital, has been able to fonn important alliances and create opportunities for profitable 
enterprise with foreign capital.,,3o 
But for many, globalization is not a benign phenomenon, but a force that is deliberately and 
systematically disrupting the fabric of many societies, particularly in the Third World. Noam 
Chomsky, in his provocative book World Orders Old And New, argues that globalization 
processes erode living standards and prospects for the poor. For him, the phenomenon marks 
a 'logical' historical progression that has left most of the world's population in desperate 
poverty and with little hope for the future. He argues that in the new world order present 
inequalities and disparities will only be accentuated. At this moment in history all alternative 
fonns of political order have collapsed (most notably Communism) and old contradictions 
have resurfaced. The central characteristic of the emerging order will be the confrontation 
between wealthy and poor nations. For Chomsky, human beings have learnt relatively little 
from their experiences. Old battles are being re-fought under new guises/old contradictions 
are hidden under a veneer of civilization and scientific progress. 
Chomsky maintains that history has been marked by the confrontation between the rich 
nations of the northern hemisphere and poor nations of the south. The Bolshevik Revolution 
of 1917 saw a departure from this main historical project as the communists attempted to 
establish an alternative political order. The ensuing East-West conflict became the central 
element of international relations. Wealthy nations, spearheaded by the United States, rallied 
to deal with the threat. For Chomsky, the Cold War represented a continuation of the North-
South encounter, "a phase ofthe North-South confrontation, so unusual in scale that it took on 
30 B.C. Smith, (1996) Understanding Third World Politics: Theories of Political Change and Development, 











a life of its own, but grounded in the familiar logic.,,31 The collapse of the Soviet Union in 
1989 marked the end of this 'experiment'. After a 70-year respite the U.S.S.R and its satellites 
have been returned to the fold of Third World nations32. Old problematics have resurfaced, as 
the North-South clash once again takes center-stage. 
For Chomsky the future is one where the logic of power politics will prevail. The new world 
order will be marked by tremendous economic inequalities both within states and between 
them. Wherever necessary state power will be used to further private economic interests. The 
historical process will be driven forward by a small power elite who control most of the 
world's wealth, and shape the policies of its richest and most powerful nations. Terrorism, 
assassination, torture, aggression racism and hypocrisy will be central characteristics, crimes 
perpetrated by the puppet regimes supported and established by the rich, to consolidate their 
power in the developing world, crimes that will be committed by the powerful themselves 
wherever their vital economic interests are at stake. In Chomsky's words: "the rich men of the 
rich societies are to rule the world, competing among themselves for a greater share of wealth 
and power and mercilessly suppressing those who stand in their way, assisted by the rich men 
of the hungry nations who do their bidding. The others serve, and suffer.,,33 Under the guise 
ofliberal democracy, political and economic globalization is entrenching an order that 
disenfranchises the vast majority of people. 
The political-economist Mihaly Simai in his compelling text, The Future Of Global 
Governance, steers a middle road between Fukuyama and Chomsky in the sense that he 
presents a more balanced assessment of globalization processes. He recognizes that 
31 Noam Chomsky. World Orders Old And New. New York: Columbia University Press, 1994. 
p.77. 
32 Chomsky (1994), p. 82. 











globalization has resulted in unprecedented political, economic, social and cultural turbulence 
and change. For him, the successful management of change and crisis in the international 
system (the successful management of globalization) will depend on effective multilateral 
cooperation, on predictability and principles of mutual responsibility, solidarity and 
accountability in the international system. He sees change at the global level as complex and 
multifaceted. Therefore, the development of rigorous mechanisms for effectively dealing with 
change is a central problematic in the study of transnational life. 
For Simai, the international economic system will stand out as the dominant arena of 
interaction in the emerging global order. He sees the process of globalization or 
"transnationalization" of the global economic system as a dominant characteristic of the 
emerging global order. For Simai, the globalization process marks the "interpenetration of 
national economies," resulting in greater "interconnectedness" and "interdependence" among 
the actors of the system.34 He highlights as distinct catalysts of globalization the development 
of efficient and extensive communications infrastructure, increased global movement of 
knowledge and capital, and increasing "interconnectedness" of global production structures. 
These factors will be responsible for more pronounced erosion of state borders. The principal 
actors of the globalization process are Transnational Corporations (TNCs). These developed 
from what Simai calls the "multinationalization" of production and competition. These 
corporations are often the link between domestic and international economic structures. Simai 
supports Noam Chomsky's assertion that the emerging order will be dominated by a number 
of giant, independent corporate entities characterized by their productive mobility. These 
corporations control the flow of capital, information and goods of the global economy. 
Through ownership and control of means of production TNCs have been able to penetrate all 










societies. Their ability to transcend national boundaries has given them decided advantages 
over the nation-state. Simai suggests that TNCs will gradually replace national power, as they 
become less and less accountable to local public authorities. 
Only by developing appropriate global governance mechanisms can the process of economic 
globalization be tamed and stability of the international system achieved. For Simai, global 
governance is the "harmonizing" of actions of the most powerful and influential states of the 
international system. Global governance is based on state interdependence and interactivity in 
a cooperative structure that is able to coordinate the management of change, upheaval and risk 
in the international arena. He outlines four broad objectives of global governance. First, to 
facilitate cooperative development of solutions to pressing global problems. Second, to better 
reconcile general global interests and specific national agendas. Third, to more effectively 
accommodate non-state actors in the global system. And finally, to protect the interests of 
future generations35 Simai views multilateral cooperation between states as a starting point to 
this end. Multilateralism is founded on principles that are absolutely essential for effective 
change and risk management in the emerging order: "international dialogue, mutual tolerance 
and respect, consensus building, accommodation of interests and values, and mutual 
understanding".36 He suggests that Multilateralism has become increasingly accepted amongst 
non-state actors. 
Simai emphasizes that the success of the emerging order is contingent on its flexibility in 
adjusting to the tremendous changes that mark globalization processes. He asserts that the 
global order must be viable for all of the world's people by being sensitive to a wide range of 
social, cultural, political and economic factors; in his words, "world order must be understood 
35 Simai (1994), p. 353. 











and governed by a universal ideology based on the general values and interests of the world's 
population. ,,37 
The preceding examination of the discourse that has arisen around the globalization 
phenomenon is by no means comprehensive. Rather, it is intended as a rudimentary guide to 
further inquiry by providing a snapshot of the terrain. The full consequences of globalization 
processes are not yet clearly discernible because the phenomenon is still becoming 
entrenched. However, certain outcomes are already identifiable - the following section 
outlines these. 
3. POLITCAL-ECONOMIC OUTCOMES OF GLOBALIZATION 
It is clear the globalization is multi-dimensional in that it is promoting change across social, 
cultural, political and economic space. However, it is largely politico-economic 
considerations that dominate the globalization discourse. Numerous scholars suggest that the 
dynamics of the capitalist world economy have the most significant bearing on the fate of the 
majority of the world's population. After the collapse of Communism in 1989, liberal 
democracy - constituted of liberal politics (democratic modes of governance) and liberal 
economics (capitalism and the free-market ethic) assumed a position of global hegemony. 
Many thinkers view Liberal Democracy as a politico-economic framework promoted by 
Western political and business elites to ensure the unobstructed workings of the free market 
across the globe to their perpetual advantage. 38 
37Simai (1994) p. 6. 
38 See for example: Richard Joseph, (1997), "Democratization in Africa after 1989: Comparative and Theoretical 











Even though the process of globalization itself is complex and multifaceted its broader 
economic logic seems quite straightforward. First, a global free market system based on 
competition, efficiency and productivity is being rapidly established. Second, no state or 
region is able to escape inclusion in the global political economy. Third, international markets 
increasingly favour competitors with the most capacity; that is, competitors that can 
instantaneously mobilize vast resources and/or coordinate economic strategy across a range of 
domains. Fourth, only economies of scale will ultimately be able to effectively compete. The 
current emphasis on economic integration of regions can be interpreted as a corollary of this 
logic. Where Europe is leading others will be forced to follow for fear of being left behind. 
Indeed, certain arrangements such as NAFTA for instance, can be viewed as a direct response 
to Europe's increasing collective capacity. 
Economic globalization is encroaching on the traditional realm of the nation-state. The 
autonomy and sovereignty of the state is being eroded as the global capitalist market increases 
its reach. The phenomenon has given rise to conceptions of international relations that 
seriously challenge the central Realist notion of state primacy in the international system. 
Realism privileges the state as the sole actor in the international arena. It holds that, "through 
calculations of power and national interest statesmen can create order out of anarchy and 
thereby moderate the inevitable conflicts of autonomous, self-centered, and competitive 
states.,,39 These premises come under pressure as states are forced to share the international 
stage with increasingly powerful non-state actors who are often not bound by international 
codes of diplomacy and conduct. While the Realist paradigm continues to emphasize the 
primacy of the state, global capitalism, the rise of international organizations and laws, and 
widespread access to global communications networks has introduced new elements that in 











reality force the nation-state to relinquish some of its power. This has had its most profound 
and detrimental effect on weaker nations (namely those of the developing world), where the 
state is often the only protective barrier between the majority of poor citizens and the ravages 
of global capitalism. 
Along these lines, Michael Chossudowsky, in his article "The Globalization of Poverty," 
maintains that the capitalist world economy curtails the capacity of nation-states to build 
national economies. He argues that the "internationalization of macro-economic policy 
transforms countries into open economic territories and national economies into reserves of 
cheap labor and natural resources.,,40 Chossudowsky labels as "market colonialism" this new 
form of economic domination. For him, it subordinates people and governments through, 
what on the surface at least, seems like the neutral interplay of market forces. In similar vein, 
B.C. Smith suggests that economic globalization essentially perpetuates a distribution of 
resources from the poor to the wealthy: "billions of dollars are implicitly taken from the poor 
and given to the rich through the impersonal mechanisms of freely negotiated international 
trade pricing.,,41 He cites as example the fact that during the 1980s Africa's exports rose by 
25% in volume, but declined in value by 30% due to low commodity prices. 
The distinguishing feature of the emerging order will be more pervasive economic interaction 
and interrelation between states and regions within the international system. The elements of 
capitalism -- free trade, market liberalization, free movement of capital, privatization, and 
deregulation of currencies -- mark global market integration. As a result of the movement of 
investments and capital between states new economic agreements have developed such as 
40 Chossudowsky, (1993), "The Globalization of Poverty," p. 37. 











GATT, WTO, NAFTA, MERCOSUR, and ASEAN. These arrangements signify integration 
at international and regional levels. 
S.K.B. Asante suggests that the implications of emerging regional arrangements is that the 
powerful trading blocs will take advantage of their stronger position as integrative groups, 
deriving maximum benefit from the economic globalization process. He predicts that the 
immediate future brings with it a certain inward-orientation that threatens to further 
marginalize those that do not fall within the prosperity spheres of the powerful trading blocs. 
Asante writes: 
Thus, with the approach of the twenty-first century, Europe is increasingly 
looking to Europe, America to America, Asia to Asia with the ultimate 
objective of establishing a unified and integrated market, capable of 
fostering production and trade, in a coordinated approach. The main 
objective of this regional and global strategy is primarily for individual 
countries in Europe, the Americas or Asia to avoid marginalization in 
international affairs and collectively to effect changes which will ensure an 
adequate balance of political and economic powers to sustain political 
independence and economic development through collective efforts.42 
The precise manner in which states and regions will align themselves in increasingly cohesive 
economic and political blocs is also the subject of intense scholarly debate.43 Although the 
analyses, predictions and visions differ greatly, the one point on which there seems to be 
consensus is that a majority of African countries will be marginal to these developments. To 
42 8.K.B. Asante, (1997), Regionalism And Africa's Development: Expectations, Reality and Challenges, New 
York: 81. Martin's Press, p. 9. 
43 See for example, Marvin Cetron and Owen Davies. Crystal Globe: The Haves And The Have-Nots Of The 











better understand this general pessimism, in academic circles and beyond, about the future of 
the continent the following section examines globalization's specific implications for Africa. 
4. GLOBALIZATION'S IMPLICATIONS FOR AFRICA 
Geographic and Strategic Isolation 
The continent's geographic and strategic isolation is of crucial importance when assessing 
Africa's prospects in the emerging order. All the other developing regions can be 
geographically and strategically linked to a prosperity sphere. Even if development in Eastern 
Europe, Asia and Latin America is ultimately only a bi-product of prosperity of prominent 
actors or blocs in their respective regions, development prospects do exist. Africa alone is in 
danger of being sidelined as the new politico-economic arrangements take shape. 
With the end of the Cold War Africa has largely lost its strategic importance. This has 
translated into much less interest in the continent. Investment from the developed world is 
lower in Africa than in any other areas. The continent is struggling to compete on the world 
market. Global recession and generally depressed international markets for primary export 
products continues to stifle Africa's export-oriented development drive. In the process, 
African countries have been forced to accept worsening terms of trade for fear of complete 
exclusion from international economic activity. Since the 1970s, the continent's share of 
world markets has been reduced by half. The changes in global political and economic modes 
of organization that are a concomitant of globalization processes will only exacerbate Africa's 
difficulties. As the regional economies become more integrated greater trade barriers are 











advantages will be able to negotiate these barriers. The prospects for African countries, 
already struggling to compete, are ominous indeed. 
The Record of Global Capitalism 
Francis Fukuyama and others insist that all will ultimately benefit from globalization and the 
liberal democracy that follows in its wake. Yet, how realistic, indeed how honest, is such an 
assessment of global capitalism? Its record in Africa is indisputable - it has severely 
exacerbated poverty. In its Human Development Report 1992, the United Nations showed that 
since 1985 the net transfer from developing to developed countries exceeded $250 billion.44 
Today, governments in sub-Saharan Africa devote 20% of their public expenditure to debt 
service (approximately $150 billion), which is 2% more than what they spend on health and 
education.45 And, a fact not often publicized by the international lending institutions is that 
most African countries are not yet re-paying the debt principal, but rather the interest accrued. 
Aid and loans are couched as solutions to burgeoning debt. But they are used as a tool by the 
wealthy to further subjugate the poor in the international political economy. Loans are 
awarded at high and floating interest rates; and both loans and aid are mostly preconditioned 
(recipient countries must institute certain macro-economic policies which ultimately favour 
the West). Governmental aid is often predicated on the financial interests of private sector 
corporations. The United States generally requires favourable conditions for American 
business interests before aid awards can be considered. African countries are unlikely to be 
able to extricate themselves from this debt-loan-aid trap. At this point, repatriated profits, 
royalties, services, interest payments and debt repayments actually outweigh investment in the 
44 B.C. Smith (1996), p. 126. 











Third World. The continent has become a net exporter of capital to the International Monetary 
Fund. 
The economist John Saul agrees that global capitalism in Africa has had "catastrophic" 
consequences. Economic globalization is resulting in the unrestricted movement of capital 
across national boundaries. Liberal economic policy being advocated and imposed by lending 
institutions such as the World Bank and IMF stipulate, amongst other things, non-interference 
by governments. Yet many scholars argue that direct government involvement in economic 
development protects citizens from the aggressive and merciless course of unimpeded global 
capitalism. Saul maintains that, "the African state ... remains a potential line of defense for 
Africans against the depredations of the world economic system: part of the solution ifthere is 
one and not part of the problem as the drive of the IMF and the World Bank to weaken the 
African state in the name of market efficiency implicitly acknowledges.,,46 Furthermore, Saul 
contends that the global spread of capitalism actually jeopardizes human rights. The creation 
of a worldwide market actually strips states of the capacity to manage economies in 
accordance with democratically determined social and ethical priorities. As the state's 
capacity to regulate the market and control its effect on its citizens diminishes, populations are 
left at the mercy of the "invisible hand" of global capitalism. 
Co-option of the African Elite 
To view the political leadership of African countries as aware of the detrimental effects of 
economic globalization on their societies but essentially helpless to prevent its course, is 
perhaps not fully representative of reality either. As Chomsky suggests, Western elites collude 
46 John Saul, (1997), "'For Fear of Being Condemned Old Fashioned': Liberal Democracy Versus Popular 











with political and economic elites of African countries to perpetuate economic and political 
subjugation of African states. Transnational corporations, the preeminent symbol of economic 
globalization, often influence domestic policies directly by co-opting powerful decision 
making interests in the host govermnent. As Smith suggests, "[i]ndigenous elites employed by 
foreign countries develop an interest in maintaining economic arrangements in which 
foreigners hold a major stake. The close contacts between members of the national politico-
administrative elite and external organizations makes the distinction between domestic and 
international affairs meaningless:,47 Arjun Makhijani has gone as far as to argue that the 
wealthy and powerful of the Third World have much more in common with the rich of the 
West than they do with their own populations.48 That a narrow social stratum in some 
developing nations has reaped tremendous material benefits from their incorporation into the 
global economic system is undeniable. This is very much in keeping with one of the predicted 
corollaries of economic globalization: the development of a transnational class of capitalist 
elites who entertain and emerging sense of class-consciousness. 
Economic Globalization and the SAP Connection 
The World Bank and International Monetary Fund's Structural Adjustment Programmes, 
posited as a development panacea for the Third Wodd, have become a primary mechanism by 
which developing countries are further incorporated into the global economy. SAPs have 
become a tool for accelerating economic globalization. Adam Przeworski contends that 
globalization, particularly where Third World nations are concerned, requires at least a partial 
surrender of national sovereignty in the political and economic realms. 49 As one unpacks the 
47 B.c. Smith (1996), p. 132. 
48 See: Arjun Makhijani, (1992) From Global Capitalism To Economic Justice: An Inquiry Into The Elimination 
Of Systemic Poverty, Violence And Environmental DestructiQi1 In The World Economy, New York: Apex Press. 











structural adjustment packages it becomes clear that these measures undermine national 
autonomy and systematically integrate developing countries further into the global economic 
system in a position of relative subordination. For more than three decades the African 
continent has been pushed towards dealing with its pressing socio-economic problems by 
pursuing economic growth strategies based on increased export of primary commodities. The 
SAPs have served to mold Africa to fit the needs of the global economy rather that offering 
hopes of economic recovery. The initiatives of the Bretton Woods institutions approximate 
the will of the powerful Western nations. Rather than facilitating development SAPs have 
resulted in widespread cuts in education and health care in Africa due to emphasis on 
economic recovery rather than social development. 
In the mid-1980s the full dimensions of Africa's economic crisis were becoming apparent. 
Ethiopia, Sudan, Somalia, the Sahel and parts of southern Africa were desperately trying to 
recover from the devastating effects of drought and famine. In most countries there were food 
shortages, depressed commodity prices and the consequent lack of foreign currency to 
purchase such essentials as medicine, basic materials for schools and for developing 
infrastructure, and spare parts for industrial equipment and transport. In 1986, the United 
Nations met in a special session on Africa. The result ofthis forum was for the World Bank 
and IMF to demand the implementation of economic reform programs as a precondition for 
the much needed development assistance. Poor governance was seen to be the root cause of 
the African crisis. Consequently, aid was to be tied to the establishment of good governance 
on the continent.5o Through the Structural Adjustment Programs the IMF and World Bank 
were emphasizing the reintroduction of competitive market forces to African economies. The 
50For details on World Bank initiatives refer to: World Bank, Sub-Saharan Africa: From Crisis To Sustainable 











award of the much needed loan packages was contingent on adoption of these programs and 
their stringent measures. 
The orthodox development paradigm provides the theoretical subtext to SAPs. The basic 
premise of orthodox models of development is that Africa's economic crisis is attributable to 
hindrances to competitive optimality. These hindrances are largely attributable to poor 
government policies. Where unimpeded these competitive forces would lead to improved 
efficiency, higher productivity, and creation of incentives. Thus, orthodox theoreticians 
identify four broad sets of government policies as inappropriate51 : 
Efforts to stimulate industry that curbs competition. These policies include levying of 
protective tariffs that shelter inefficient private and public enterprises; government 
nationalization or acquisition of shares of ownership of mines, large farms, factories, etc.; 
and high corporate and income taxes that serve as a disincentive for foreign investors. 
• Government agricultural policies such as subsidization and price controls (setting of price 
ceilings and floors); and the establishment of marketing boards, which discourage farmers 
from expanding production or forces them to resort to "parallel" or 'black' markets.52 The 
result is an increased need for imports of foodstuffs, and loss of potential foreign 
exchange earnings. 
5lUseful in identifying these categories has been, World Bank, Towards Sustained Development in Sub-Saharan 
Africa: A Joint Programme of Action. Washington DC.: International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development, 1984. 
52For compelling work on establishment and role of alternative markets in Africa see: Christine Jones and 
Michael Roemer, (1989), "Parallel Markets in Developing Countries," World Development, Special Issue, Vol. 











• Exaggerated expansion of government administration, social welfare programs, and badly 
planned and unproductive projects that increase government expenditure and result in 
domestic borrowing. These policies increase the likelihood of corruption and aggravate 
inflation. 
• Poor government monetary and fiscal policies such as: suppressing interest rates and 
directing credit; setting minimum wages; levying taxes that discourage foreign 
investment, overvaluing currency exchange rates; and increased borrowing abroad to 
finance growing import costs. 
The World Bank's structural adjustment measures emphasize longer term restructuring of 
African economies. The logistical stipulations include the training of more middle-level and 
high-level personnel, investment in more applied research, and the preparation of more 
accurate and up-to-date financial and statistical data in order to facilitate better planning, 
monitoring of performance, and formulation of new policy. The Bank's package has also 
emphasized the establishment of consistent priorities, policies and programs, and better 
coordination of processes of implementation and review.53 However, these relevant and 
reasonable logistical requirements often mask macro-economic conditionalities that carry 
significant and detrimental implications by undermining government. For example, the World 
Bank advocates the replacement of parastatals with private entrepreneurs, particularly in areas 
of high productivity. It encourages increased agricultural exports to augment foreign 
exchange and the earnings of peasant farmers, as well as the expansion of industrial exports 
wherever possible. And, the Bank advocates the removal of trade restrictions that hinder entry 
47 Ann Seidman and Frederick Anang, eds., (1992), 21 st Century Africa: Towards A New Vision Of Self-











into international market systems on the basis of comparative advantage. Similarly, the IMF 
package includes measures to foster increased competition from imported goods by 
eliminating foreign exchange controls and import licensing; to privatize public enterprises; 
and, to increase exports by devaluating local currencies to lower real costs and prices. 54 Once 
a government has committed to these measures, the IMF will evaluate its performance on a 
quarterly basis. Subsequent loan pay-outs are withheld if the Fund is unsatisfied with the 
progress. 
The imposition of liberal economic policies and free market principles on structurally weak 
African economies has opened them up to the ravages of stronger western competition. The 
state in the developing world has traditionally been a buffer between the international 
economic system and the local economy, but SAPs have stressed government non-
interference. Without some protective measures, at least in the initial stages, fledgling 
industries and enterprises have simply not been able to get off the ground. To service debt 
Africa has been required to generate foreign exchange. This has predominantly entailed the 
growth of cash-crops regardless ofthe food needs of communities. Many nations have gone 
from being net exporters of food crops to being net importers. The result has been widespread 
starvation and increased reliance on food aid from the West. In effect, SAPs have undermined 
macro-economic planning by policy discontinuity and emphasis on short-term crisis 
management rather than on long-term economic planning. 
Furthermore, by emphasizing the production of commodities for export SAPs have underrated 
the possibilities of stimulating economic growth through fostering domestic demand. The aim 
has been for international competition to spur greater efficiency and to foster partnerships 











between Africans and foreign investors, resulting in a transfer of skills, technologies and 
capital. But the fact is that SAPs have largely failed to attract foreign investment to Africa, 
and have been unable to control inflation and rising prices of even most basic commodities. 
Government reductions in expenditure on health, education and welfare have further reduced 
already low living standards. The elimination of foreign exchange controls and import 
licensing has enabled high-income groups to import more luxury goods, reducing reserves of 
foreign currency for the import of essentials such as machinery and equipment to build 
industries that ultimately provide jobs for low-income groups. These measures have also 
thwarted many of the local industries and aggravated unemployment because imported goods 
compete with those that are locally produced. Devaluation has caused massive under-
valuation of African currencies, which has enabled the West to import raw materials from 
Africa at extremely low real prices. It has also greatly increased the cost of imported 
necessities such as fuel, machinery and other equipment, aggravating inflationary pressures. 
These fiscal measures have benefited only a small stratum within African societies, and in the 
process marginalized important sectors of the economy. Adebayo Adedeji, former Secretary 
General of the ECA, articulates this point: 
By promoting the fortunes of a class of speculators and currency dealers 
who surf freely on the waves of high turnover financial capital in a state of 
complete alienation from social and cultural conditions in their own 
countries, SAPs have marginalized the productive classes of entrepreneurs 
and workers. 55 
The eminent economist Karl Polanyi has argued that because markets constitute a powerful 
source of sociopolitical change and produce equally powerful responses as societies attempt 











full and unregulated development of market forces. 56 The implication is that the West, in 
aggressively advocating free-market principles, is imposing conditions and rules on 
developing countries that they themselves do not fully abide by. 
In the final analysis, SAPs must be seen are a mechanism by which African countries are 
being simultaneously integrated and subordinated in the international political-economy. 
SAPs facilitate capital and resource extraction from the continent and ensure a continued 
supply of low-wage labor and markets for Western manufactures. SAPs allow transnational 
corporations to maintain control over manufacturing processes, technology and finance. They 
advocate export-led development so that the developing world can earn foreign exchange to 
service debt. In the final analysis SAPs depress further the standard ofliving of a majority of 
African people. 
• •• 
Given the nature of the emerging world order it seems clear that under present circumstances 
the developing world will have little say in its equitable reformulation. Given the desperate 
circumstances in which Africa presently finds itself, scholarly pessimism about the 
continent's future is hardly surprising. Jacques Attali, longtime advisor to former French 
Prime Minister Francois Mitterand, refers to Africa as a "lost continent". He writes that "[t]he 
most probable future for Africa is tragic: it will be the only region on the whole planet that is 
entirely excluded from abundance."s7 In similar vein Marvin Cetron and Owen Davies 
suggest: 
55 Adebayo Adedeji. An Alternative For Africa. Journal o/Democracy, October 1994, Vol. 5, No.4. p. 123. 
56 Karl Polanyi, (1957), The Great Transformation: The Political And Economic Origins Of Our Time, Boston: 
Beacon Press. 











This giant, troublesome continent has had a difficult past, and there is 
regrettably little that is good to be said about its future. Slight economic 
improvement combined with a rapidly growing population spells ruin for 
Africa ..... Desertification, drought, and famine remain constant threats. 
The next ten years will be bleak ones for the dark continent. 58 
Even the most staunch Afro-optimist must concede that this moment of unprecedented and 
accelerated historical change is a precarious one for the African continent. At a time when 
new modes of international organization are being negotiated and established the very real 
possibility exists of the continent's permanent designation to irrelevance. 
There is little doubt that there is a fundamental need for a more genuine Western commitment 
to Third World development. The wealthy must realize that the crisis of underdevelopment, 
poverty and desperation can no longer be effectively localized or contained. In an increasingly 
interconnected world, crisis and chaos in the South threaten the rich nations of the North. 
Therefore, the wealthy need to reevaluate their priorities, and calculate more carefully the 
incentives of a more concerted and sympathetic approach to development. Ade Ajayi makes 
the following percient observation: 
The industrialized countries have imbibed the lesson that the way to 
promote national development is not to over-exploit the poor and the 
workers, but to empower them through education and a fairer 
distribution of resources to become active participants in the process of 
development. They are yet to appreciate that the same lesson is applicable 
at the international level. 59 
58Cetron and Davies (1991) p. 185. 
59 Ajayi, Ade. "The Search for a New World Order: an African Perspective," in, Ludestad & Westad, eds. 











At the same time, Africa cannot afford to pin its developmental hopes on the goodwill or 
conscience of the wealthy. Indeed, why should the rich ever wish to alter a status quo that so 
overwhelmingly favours them? To bank on the trickle-down effect of Western economic 
prosperity is surely a recipe for disaster. Neither can withdrawal from an inherently 
exploitative international system be considered a possibility for future development. The Pan-
Africanism and radical Dependency Theory of the 1960s and early 1970s, which advocated 
precisely this, have been rendered obsolete by globalization. The impetus for the continent's 
recovery must come from within; more proactive strategies are necessary. A self-help 
orientation is ultimately the only viable option for the future. 
To reiterate the argument thus far, the paper has argued that economic globalization is 
resulting in certain critical transformations in the international political economy - we are 
witnessing the emergence of a single, highly competitive market, based on free-market 
capitalist principles, which inherently favour the most powerful competitors in the system, 
while simultaneously subordinating developing countries. Furthermore, the new 
organizational logic of the international political economy necessitates economics of scale and 
collective capacity. These corollary characteristics of economic globalization demand the 
prioritization and a serious re-evaluation of African regionalism initiatives. Ultimately 
effective cooperation and integration is the continent's only sustainable and long-term 














ASSESSING AFRJCAN REGINALISM 
Europe will be. It will be because it has to be. Indeed, it is already 
coming about. But will the forces leading to its creation be 
powerful enough to succeed before it is too late? Which are the 
most effective, most certain ways of achieving this goal? Should 
one proceed by stages or should one pass them by and go 
immediately to a comprehensive solution? Scores of questions 
and difficulties appear immediately, and they seem to multiply 
the more one reflects. Yet, satisfactory answers must be found. It 
is impossible to ignore them, to place our fate in luck or in blind 
destiny to resolve them, for good or ill .... Europe is a task at 
once magnificent and necessary. The difficulties which lie on the 
way are in proportion to the magnitude of the goal to be 
achieved. If the problems are numerous and on occasion 
unprecedented, there is no one of them which is not susceptible 
to a practical and reasonable solution. The building of Europe is 
now a question of wilL 60 
In 1957, Paul Van Zeeland, Belgium's Minister of State articulated the above view of 
European integration. Four decades later his words have a deep resonance in Africa. The need 
for, and obstacles to, more effective and pervasive regional cooperation have never been 
greater. And yet, the political will to make regional integration a reality in Africa seems to be 
lacking. The problem does not lie with the idea of regional integration per se, because there 
does exist a broad consensus among Africa's political elite, scholars and experts on the 
desirability and importance ofregionalism. The locus of heated contest is logistical 












considerations, that is, the wrangle over form and process of cooperation and integration. By 
examining the organizational logic of the emerging global political economic order, and 
particularly its impact on Africa, the first part of this research has provided some clues as to 
why the consensus over regionalism's desirability has developed. 
Other regions of the world are rising to the challenges of economic globalization by 
organizing into more cohesive and integrated political economic blocs. For Africa not to 
follow suite would be perilous; such an eventuality would surely lead to increased (perhaps 
permanent) marginalization in the international system. Greater economic and political 
cohesion seems the most viable alternative for igniting and sustaining the continent's stalled 
development drive. African Heads of State and Government acknowledged as much in their 
adoption of the Priority Programme for Economic Recovery 1986-1990. They accepted that, 
"Economic integration through sub-regional, regional and continental cooperation is today a 
top priority which will enable the economies of the African countries to be viable within a 
system of international relations characterized by inequality in the balance ofpower.,,61 For 
Africa integration must become a far-reaching program to structure a more dynamic, 
expanding continental economy that will steadily improve the conditions and quality oflife 
for all the people. 
The second part of the paper argues for a strategic re-orientation that takes us away from the 
'macro' or constitutional approaches to integration that have largely faltered after twenty-five 
years of experimentation. Instead it advocates strategies that prioritize functional economic 
relationships below the level of the state. Such a functional orientation is compatible and 
consistent with the establishment of an African Free Trade Area rather than an African 
61 Organization of African Unity, (1985), Africa's Priority Programme for Economic Recovery 1986~1990, sect. 











Common Market, which has thus far dominated the agenda. The assessment of African 
regionalism begins with conceptual clarifications: the terms integration and regionalism are 
examined. This is followed by a cursory assessment of cooperation and integration initiatives 
to date, and on a more general level, the obstacles, impediments and problems of integration 
on the continent are discussed. This provides the necessary context for the last two sections, 
which begin the process of solution-building. Functionalism is elaborated as a possible 
theoretical antecedent for future initiatives of African regionalism. Functionalism's central 
propositions are examined, and its adaptability to the African context is assessed. The 
following section draws useful lessons from the European integration experience. Finally, the 
possibilities and prospects for more successful future initiatives are examined. The discussion 
centers on the establishment of an African Free Trade Area, which is consistent with and 
complementary to functional theory. To reiterate my earlier disclaimer, this treatment of 
African regionalism is not intended as a policy template. It begins the process of formulating 
an 'ideal type' theoretical framework that may inform and guide future policy prescriptions. 
1. CONCEPTUAL CLARIFICATIONS: INTEGRATION & REGIONALISM 
Integration 
The adoption of the term 'integration' into the international relations lexicon is a fairly recent 
phenomenon. It became an idee force in the autumn of 1949, when Paul G. Hoffman, then 
Marshall Plan Administrator, applied the term 'economic integration' in the context of a 
specific group of countries in Western Europe. The concept itself presents certain semantic 
difficulties in that there is no consensus on whether it signifies a condition, a process, or both. 











integration is seen as a condition in which nations are tied together by organized institutions 
and written rules. The existence of international law and an inter-governmental institution 
such as the United Nations is seen by many as testament to the fact that certain levels of 
integration among nations exist. Earnst B. Haas, relying primarily on the formulations of 
sociologist Amitai Etzioni, offers a conception of integration that goes beyond this minimal 
definition yet retains the notion of integration as a condition. He understands integration as a 
condition that is in evidence when, "among several states one agency disposes of a monopoly 
over the means of violence, occupies the center in decision-making, and constitutes the central 
focus for the emotional identification of the population of the several states.,,62 Economic 
perceptions in particular oscillate between conception of integration as condition and process. 
A minimalist definition equates it with a flow of transactions across the boundaries of the 
units to be integrated. For economists, integration is seen as the "absence of rules that 
discriminate against trade or movement of factors," but they also use the word to refer to the 
steps whereby this condition is approximated.63 The sociologist Paul Meadows suggests that 
mutually supporting inputs into a social system tend to be associated with growth of structure, 
expansion of functions, development equilibrium - this process can be summed up as 
'integration' .64 
62 Ernst 8. Haas, (1964), Beyond The Nation-State: Functionalism And International Organization, Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, p. 27. See also: Amitai Etzioni, (1962), "A Paradigm for the Study of Political 
Unification," World Politics, XV, p. 69. Karl Deutsch also approximates this conceptualization of integration. 
He defines it at the broadest level as a condition where states opt to forego the use of violence as a means of 
resolving differences. See: Karl W. Deutsch, (1964), Political Community At The International Level, New 
York: Doubleday Press, pp. 33-40. 
63 Haas (1964), p. 27. 
64 See: Paul Meadows, (1957), "Models, Systems and Science," American SOciological Review, XXII, p. 6. In 
similar vein and also in the sociological tradition, Talcott Parsons views integration as either a rigid condition of 
complementarity between components of the system which remain in equilibrium; or, as a dynamic or "moving 











Cognizant of the semantic difficulties, this research adopts a broad understanding of 
integration as a process that incrementally erodes territorial boundaries as more and more 
links are forged at sub-national levels. This is essentially Haas' formulation: 
If the present international scene is conceived of as a series of interacting and 
mingling national environments, and in terms of their participation in 
international organizations, then integration would describe the process of 
increasing the interaction and the mingling so as to obscure the boundaries 
between the system of international organizations and the environment 
provided by their nation-state members.65 
This research distinguishes between cooperation and integration. The former signifies joint 
actions by two or more nations on specific programs or projects in functionally specified 
areas. Integration is more formal in that it implies the development of supranational structures 
and institutions that plan and implement common policies. Both are viewed as a means of 
pooling valuable resources and avoiding duplication, with the aim of expanding productive 
outputs beyond existent national and regional capacities. 
Old and New Regionalism 
For the purposes of this paper regionalism represents the various forms and contents of 
economic integration arrangements (common markets, free trade areas, and harmonizations of 
policy) that exist at both regional and sub-regionallevels.66 A distinction is increasingly 
drawn between old and new conceptualizations of regionalism. From the developing world 
perspective new regionalism differs from the old in two important respects. First, the old 
65 Haas (1964), p. 29. 
66 The African Common Market and African Development Bank represent regional arrangements; while at the 











regionalism of the 1960s represented an extension of import-substitution industrialization 
strategy from the national to the regionalleve1.67 Thus, it was inward-looking, whereas new 
regionalism is taking place in a climate of outward-oriented policies. Secondly, developing 
countries are no longer looking for partnerships exclusively with other developing countries 
but also with developed ones. This has been particularly pronounced in Latin America, where 
links with the United States have been actively pursued. 
Bjorn Hettne has defmed new regionalism as a multidimensional process of regional 
integration that includes economic, political, social and cultural aspects.68 Hettne stresses 
non-economic issues, that is, the political and security dimensions of regional integration. He 
sees regional integration as a package rather than a single policy. For him, the concept of 
regionalism goes beyond notions of free trade areas and market integration. "Political 
initiatives of creating territorial identities, political convergence, collective security and 
regional coherence now seem to be the primary, neo-mercantilist goals of the new 
regionalism.,,69 For Hettne the other significant difference between old and new regionalism 
is that new regionalism is spontaneous and from below (firm, market and consumer driven), 
whereas old regionalism was imposed from above (bureaucratically driven). The latter, grand 
design arrangements were more prone to failure, as record of initiatives in Africa bear out. 
The World Bank definition of regionalism predictably places far greater emphasis on 
67 Industrialization through import substitution was the primary rationale behind regionalism in developing 
states. It was believed that infant industries could develop their capacity to export within protected regional 
markets, ultimately enhancing their capacity to compete on the global market 
68 B. Hettne and A. Inota, (1994), "The New Regionalism: Implications for Global Development and 
International Security," UNUIWIDER, Helsinki. Cited in Percy. S. Mistry, "Open Regionalism: Stepping Stone 
or Milestone Toward an Improved Multilateral System?", in Jan Joost Teunissen, cd., (J 995), RegionaJism and 
the Global Economy: The Case Of Latin America And The Caribbean, The Hague: FONDAD, p. 13. 











economic aspects, although it does recognize the importance of non-economic factors.7o For 
the Bank new regionalism remains essentially an economically enhanced free trade concept. 
Asante identifies these enhancements as: liberalization of trade in services; liberalization in 
movements of capital and labour; harmonization of regulatory regimes; the emergence of 
North-South regional arrangements that are now becoming the rule rather than the 
exception. 71 For Carlos Braga new regionalism signifies a shift by developing countries 
toward the 'right' kind of objectives: i.e. away from inward-looking and protectionist agendas 
(emphasis on exclusivity), to a more outward-oriented and competitive outlook (emphasis on 
inclusivity ). 
This new conceptualization of regionalism is largely a consequence/result of globalization of 
world production, and rapid expansion and increasing linkages among the world's 
industrialized and rapidly growing regions. Asante, in his discussion of new regionalism, 
reinforces one of the main argument strands of this research: that economic globalization, 
particularly its regionalization concomitant, privileges the strongest competitors in the 
international political economy to the severe detriment of developing states. He writes: 
Because of the extensive linkages amongst these dynamic regions, it is 
unlikely that regionalism will have as much impact on their trade as on the 
late-comers - Africa and Latin America - which are now struggling to join 
the bandwagon of globalization. The implication of this world of trading 
blocs is that ... [they] will take advantage of their stronger position as 
integrative groups and derive benefits from the emerging international 
economic system.72 
70 See recent World Bank study authored by Carlos Braga, (1994), "The New Regionalism and its 
Consequences," Washington D.C.: World Bank. 
71 Asante (1997), p. 7. 











Our exploration of the globalization phenomenon and our resultant understanding of the 
emerging political economic order do of course make the most compelling case for regional 
cooperation and integration. But, when one moves down the ladder of abstraction, that is, 
from a systemic to a regional level of analysis, a number of explicit economic imperatives 
emerge. These require brief elaboration. 
2. THE CASE FOR REGIONAL COOPERATION/INTEGRATION 
Africa is the poorest of all the developing regions. World Bank statistics indicate that intra-
African trade has hardly increased at all as a proportion of total trade in the last twenty years. 
These problems stem partially from the fact that small economies are prevalent on the 
continent. It is generally true that low levels of income and small popUlations characterize 
individual African economies. The data is telling: half the states on the continent have 
popUlations of less than 5 million each, with only about a third with populations over 10 
million; and, 30 countries accounting for one-half of Africa's population have per capita 
incomes ofless than US$350 per annum, with only seven states (less than 10% of the 
continent's popUlation) having per capita incomes per ammm of over US$1 000.73 The 
conclusion born of these figures is that the size of individual markets on the continent is 
seriously circumscribed by low income levels and small populations. Comparative analysis 
reveals that in all but a few African countries the market for all products is no larger than 
those of the smaller cities of the industrialized world. Economists stress that such small 
markets cannot sustain modem enterprises because the cost of production is equivalently 
73 See: B. Ndiaye, in Anyang' Nyong'o, cd., (1990), Regional Integration In Africa: Unfinished Agenda, 











higher than in places where economies of scale are being realized.74 What is envisioned is the 
creation of larger markets through integration, which would, in turn, foster the development 
of modern enterprises. Other benefits of larger markets include opportunities for greater 
specialization, enhanced efficiency arising from competition, and increased technological 
development. Ultimately, economic integration would enable these small economies to better 
harness their domestic resources for development. 
3. TWENTY~FIVE YEARS OF COOPERATION AND INTEGRATION INITIATIVES IN AFRICA 
Ever since the early 1960s there have been efforts by African countries to initiate effective 
structures of regional cooperation as a way of promoting socio-economic development and 
breaking the cycle of dependence on the West. Since the 1960s many institutions for regional 
cooperation have been developed but these have largely proved ineffectual. That there has 
been a broad consensus amongst the leadership on the continent that greater integration is 
desirable is undeniable. There has, however, been widespread disagreement on the nature, 
scope, strategy and ultimate goals of such efforts. Two prominent groups can be distinguished 
in the logistical debate. The first group, the Pan-Africanists, favored immediate and total 
integration of the African continent, which entailed the setting up of a single continental 
government. They saw political integration as the first step, a prerequisite to economic 
integration. Its most prominent members included Cheikh Anta Diop, K warne Nkrumah, 
Sekou Toure and Modibo Keita. The second group, the Gradualists (or Functionalists), 
favored a more gradual approach to African integration. Functionalists favored the 
74 This dire situation has caused a prominent scholar on African regionalism to comment: "[Africa), with over 
600 million inhabitants scattered over 50 fragmented, balkanized, independent and sovereign entities cannot be 
taken seriously as an important and effective partner in the global economy of the twenty-first century with its 











preservation of sovereignty of African states. For personalities such as Felix Houphouet-
Boigny, Jomo Kenyatta and Leopold Senghor, economic integration had to precede political 
integration. They advocated the formation of loose cooperative structures in technical and 
economic areas. Regional institutions would act as a stepping-stone to more pervasive 
political and economic integration of the continent. The Pan-Africanists have largely passed 
from the scene. Most of the initiatives of regional integration today, use variations of the 
Functionalist framework. 
Alternatives of Form and Process of Integration 
The debate over alternatives of form and process that integration initiatives in Africa should 
take has been equally diverse. If one can conceive a spectrum of options regarding form, then 
at one end would be federalism, and at the other 'cooperationalism,' for the lack of a better 
designation. There are of course many variants of federalism, but generally it involves the 
establishment of some form of supranational entity to whom some or most aspects of national 
sovereignty are ceded. Those on the continent who have advocated Federalism have been 
preoccupied with degrees of centralization and transfer of authority away from the nation-
state to a supranational structure. Cooperationalism denotes an indefinite extension of forms 
of international cooperation undertaken by particular parties. Somewhere between these poles 
some scholars identify a third option sometimes labeled 'unionism'. John A. Loftus has 
described the latter as involving the maintenance of respect for national sovereignty and 
national traditions, and, "the quest for such common desiderata as a standing common 











ministers, and the extension of all possible areas of common, as distinguished from (and little 
h ) 
. . ,,75 
more t an co-operatIve, actIOn. 
As to process: distinction is made between a gradual approach to integration and a more 
drastic and immediate approach that is, the difference between integration by successive 
stages and immediate integration. Some scholars of integration have argued that there is a 
time and place for both the gradualist and immediate approach. They suggest that some things 
can only be achieved by immediate and decisive action - the adoption of a common currency, 
or the ceding of an aspect of sovereignty to a supranational entity for instance.76 
Market Integration 
The focus in recent years has been on the integration of markets. Market integration, 
according to neo-classical economic theory, facilitates the expansion of economic 
opportunities through specialization based on assessment of comparative advantage and 
economies of scale. Those who have explored the question of regional integration in Africa 
have leaned on neo-classical theory on the evolution of integrated markets. Five successive 
stages are identified: the first is the formation of a free trade area, which implies the abolition 
of trade barriers amongst members of the community; the second stage is the formation of a 
customs union, which establishes common tariff policies towards non-member states; third, 
the establishment of a common market, which entails the formation of a single large market 
within which quantitative restrictions on the movement of goods and factors of production, as 
75 John A. Loftus, in C. Grove Haines, ed., (1957), p. 103. 
76 Loftus is not convinced by this argument. He states that the adoption of a single currency amounts to little 
more than a formalistic action because the conditions that are required to take such a decisive step - widespread 
inter-convertibility between currencies and relative uniformity and stability of prevailing rates of exchange-
have more often than not been arrived at by degrees. See: John A. Loftus, in C. Grove Haines, ed., (1957), 











well as monetary barriers to the flow of payments and, eventually, all tariffs are pennanently 
removed; the fourth stage is complete economic union, which involves the hannonization of 
national economic policies among member states; and finally, complete economic integration, 
which entails the establishment of a supra-national authority responsible for unification of 
economic and social policies.77 
In the Lagos Plan of Action proponents of regional economic integration outlined a strategy to 
move from the neo-classical theoretical framework towards a practical initiative. The Lagos 
Plan proposed the creation of an African Economic Community. The aim was, "to promote 
collective, accelerated, self-reliant and self-sustaining development of member states; co-
operation among these states; and their integration in the economic, social, and cultural 
fields.,,78 The plan proposed a two-stage process. In the first stage, to be achieved through the 
decade of the 1980s, the aim was to strengthen existing regional groupings of economic 
cooperation, and to create additional ones, so as to fonn a network that covered the entire 
continent. Furthennore, the aim was to strengthen sectoral integration and to promote 
cooperation and coordination among the regional groupings for the eventual establishment of 
an African Common Market. In stage two sectoral integration was to be further strengthened, 
and measures were to be taken for the establishment of an African Economic Community 
complete with supra-national coordinating institutions. The sub-regional organizations that 
were subsequently created to fonn the elaborate network covering the entire continent were: 
the Economic Community of West African States -- ECOW AS (Lagos, May 28, 1975. 16 
members); the Preferential Trade Area for Eastern and Southern Africa -- PTA (Lusaka, 
December 21, 1981. 16 members); the Economic Community of Central African States --
CEEAC (Libreville, October 18, 1983. 10 members); and the Union of the Arab Maghreb--











DAM (February 17, 1989. 5 members).79 
An African Common Market: Background, Strategy and Viability 
The Lagos Plan of Action encapsulated the OAD's desire to establish an African Common 
Market CACM) by the year 2000.80 The vision should be understood as an effort to remove 
barriers to the development of a free market, rather than a measure for controlled or planned 
economies. The goal of a Common Market as a vehicle to economic integration was not to 
channel economic forces in a given direction, but on the contrary to remove obstacles to the 
natural growth of these forces. The Common Market was to facilitate mutually enhancing 
economic competition among member states, resulting in an amelioration of the continent's 
competitiveness on the world market. 
The Lagos Plan of Action was primarily comprised of broad and sweeping guidelines for the 
establishment and strengthening of sub-regional organizations that would facilitate the ACM. 
An ACM was to be achieved through a collaboration of regional common markets rather than 
the linking of all African states. These guidelines did not take adequate account of unique 
circumstances on the continent. There was a naIve assumption that sub-regional communities 
would automatically transfer their allegiance to a continental arrangement. The Draft Protocol 
on African Common Market prepared by the Council of Ministers offered the following vague 
pledge, reminiscent in language and rhetoric to previous OAD declarations: 
78 Organization of African Unity, (1981), Lagos Plan of Actionfor the Economic Development of Africa, 1980-
2000. Lagos: OAU, p. 6. 
79 See: Guy Martin, in Seidman and Anang, (1992), p. 71. 
80 The Lagos Plan of Action marked the culmination of efforts by African Heads of government to articulate a 
system of economic cooperation that had begun as early as 1968 in Algeirs, in Addsis Ababa in 1970 and 1973, 
and Libreville in 1977. The 1979 Arusha Ministerial Meeting of the Group of77, and the OAU-organized 
Monrovia Symposium on Africa's future development prospects towards 2000, provided the intellectual fillip for 











To promote development, co-operation and integration among its 
member states, in all economic, social, and cultural fields for the purpose 
of fostering closer relations among its member states towards accelerated 
collective self-reliant and endogenous economic, social and cultural 
development of the African continent to raise the quality of standard of 
living and dignity and respect of its people.81 
Essentially the protocol failed to translate objectives into action. The only section to do so 
outlined orthodox procedures for establishing an African common external tariff, and a 
common commercial policy towards non-members. This was to be achieved by first 
eliminating tariff and non-tariff barriers amongst participating states. The introduction of a 
series of sub-regional and regional economic activities in distinctive stages82 was envisioned, 
These were: 
1. the facilitation of sectoral integration at all levels and in certain areas such as food and 
agriculture, science and technology, transportation, and industry; 
2. removal of barriers to free movement of people, services and capital between participating 
states; 
3. emphasis on the promotion of joint projects in economic spheres, and the harmonization 
of development strategies and policies; 
4. harmonization of financial policies and monetary integration with the final objective of 
adopting a single currency among member states; 
Final Report of the Monrovia Symposium on the Future Development Prospects of Africa Toward the Year 2000, 
Monrovia-Liberia, 12-16 February, 1979, (Addis Ababa: OAU), 
81 Draft Protocol on the African Economic Community, OAU Doc, ECMlECO, 8 (SIV) Rev, 2 Add, 1, 
82 Ralph L Onwuka, in Onwuka and Sesay, eds" (1992) The Future Of Regionalism In Africa, London: 











5. the establishment of a Common Development Fund for compensation, guarantee and 
development; and 
6. such other activities that would promote the grand objective of the Community as may be 
decided upon. 
Three principal factors rendered these objectives unrealistic and unattainable, particularly in 
the established time frame. The first is the external dependence of Africa's political economy, 
rooted in past colonialism and in the absence of technology and capital. This has resulted in 
relationships of dependence between developing and developed countries that greatly curtail 
the maneuverability of African states in regional arrangements. The second factor, 
inextricably linked to the first, is the low level of intra-African trade. Statistics indicate that 
since the mid 1960s volume of trade with developed countries has increased while business 
with African neighbors has steadily decreased. Although a marginal increase in intra-African 
trade was recorded in 1993, Africa trails all other regions in this important area.83 Third, past 
experience indicates that there are conflicting perceptions of costs and benefits of cooperation 
among African states. This is partially concomitant of the economic disparities between 
countries. All three factors impede the establishment and operation of an African Common 
Market. In the final analysis, the idea of the ACM faltered and collapsed because it tried to do 
too much too quickly. 
By viewing efforts of African regionalism in historical context, the obstacles, impediments 
and problems of the continent's integration initiatives begin to emerge. The following section 











4. OBSTACLES, IMPEDIMENTS AND PROBLEMS 
That every initiative of cooperation or integration on the African continent has had its unique 
obstacles and impediments is undeniable. However, certain common problems can be 
discerned. This section introduces them under four broad categories: (1) logistical 
considerations; (2) Institutional proliferation and deficiencies; (3) political-ideological factors; 
and (4) external dependence. 
Logistical Considerations 
Here logistical considerations denote issues such as the distribution of benefits, and the roles, 
attitudes and levels of commitment of member states. The distribution of benefits and costs of 
integration become an area of contestation. States have widely varying populations, resources 
and capacities. Some will be able to take greater advantage of economic integration. 
Therefore, one inherent problem is that integration tends to yield unequal benefits. Typically, 
there is a need for some sort of redistributive mechanisms. These have taken the form of 
financial compensatory schemes. But, because the perceptions of member states differ, these 
mechanisms are seldom able to ensure an equitable or acceptable distribution of benefits and 
costs -- some states believe that they are contributing too much, while others feel that they are 
gaining too little. This is closely related to questions of commitment. States are often 
unwilling to implement policies that are perhaps not in their immediate national interest. 
Regional organizations have been plagued by threats by certain members to withdraw. Lastly, 
there have been problems of power imbalances. Weaker or poorer states may feel that a 
particular member is dominating the organization. This state may be using its power as 
83 African intra-regional trade increased to 8.4 per cent in 1993, as compared to 72 per cent in Western Europe, 











leverage to push through certain initiatives and to determine the organization's agenda. 
Institutional Proliferation and Deficiency 
Institutional proliferation and deficiency are major obstacles to successful cooperation and 
integration. There are over 200 regional cooperation and integration organizations on the 
continent, both inter-governmental and non-governmental. The activities of these 
organizations overlap considerably, resulting in duplication of functions and multiple 
membership. For example, Niger is a member of twenty-five of these organizations, while 
Mauritania belongs to three different economic communities. This raises issues of mixed 
loyalties and conflict of interests, and further stretches scarce human and administrative 
resources. Other institutional deficiencies are over-centralization and over-politicization of 
regional organizations. 
Political-Ideological Factors 
The slow pace of cooperation and integration throughout the regions can be partly attributed 
to the range of different ideologies and related development strategies of member countries. 
The Union of the Arab Maghreb is an example. This body is composed of Libya and 
Mauritania, whose governments are classified by some as Islamic Fundamentalist; Algeria, 
which has strong socialist leanings; Tunisia, which has adopted a Liberal Democratic system; 
and, Morocco and its Liberal Monarchy. Similarly, ideological contlict between Kenya and 
Tanzania debilitated the East African Community. The prevalence of military coups, 
particularly in west and central Africa has resulted in a climate of political instability, which 











has greatly hampered efforts of cooperation and integration. 
External Dependence 
External dependence continues to be a pervasive problem. For example, France continues to 
dominate its former colonies politically and economically, a factor which has proven a major 
obstacle to regional cohesion in west and central Africa. Another example is the ratification of 
the 1989 Lome IV Convention, which links sixty-eight African, Caribbean and Pacific 
countries to the EEC, in a ten year contractual agreement. Since inter-regional trade is 
relatively small compared to Africa's trade with the EEC, such ties remain important for 
many African countries. But, these economic and political links have caused conflict of 
interests, and have often proved incompatible with intra-regional cooperation and integration. 
The failure of cooperation and integration initiatives to date has prompted scholars to re-
evaluate their theoretical markers, strategies and priorities. The following section enters the 
contentious logistical/methodological debate on form and process for African cooperation. 













THEORETICAL ANTECEDENT FOR AFRICAN REGIONAL INTEGRATION? 
Functionalism has no single prophet, no scriptures, and no dogma. As an 
ideology seeking to reform the form and substance of international life it has 
had a variety of spokesmen since the 1870's. But far from constituting a 
coherent body of militants, these people are united only by a vague and shifting 
syndrome of common attitudes and propositions: in fact, it is of the essence of 
Functionalism to avoid rigidity and dogma. 84 
This description, furnished by one of Functionalism's principle proponents85, reflects a certain 
dynamism. It is precisely the fact that Functionalism is not a rigid explanatory system that 
enables us to assess and apply certain aspects of it to our study of regionalism and integration 
in Africa. As an analytical framework Functionalism does not aspire to comprehensive 
explanatory power. It qualifies, therefore, less as a theory and more as a reformist ideology. 
This gives us leeway to disaggregate Functionalism, and isolate the propositions that are 
useful to our consideration of African regionalism and integration. 
This section is divided into four parts. The first highlights the theoretical antecedents of 
Functionalism. The second part outlines its central tenets and propositions. The third 
discusses 'interest politics' as the foundation for viable Functionalism. The fourth briefly 
examines the Neo-Functionalist movement, specifically how it has modified the Functionalist 
process, and how this provides us with a conceptual foundation for thinking about African 
regionalism. 
84 Haas (1964), p. 8. 
85 Alongside Ernst Haas, other thinkers of the Functionalist school include: Edgar Saveney, Paul S. Reinsch, 











Antecedents of Functionalism 
Functionalism gained prominence in the aftennath of the World Wars. It addressed itself to 
the question of how to order international society after catastrophic conflict, and how to 
reduce the risk and possibility of interstate war in the future. Functionalism was grounded in 
the belief that political conflicts and war could only be eliminated where progress in 
international economic and social cooperation was achieved. Interstate war would eventually 
be eliminated as cooperative endeavors were expanded to a wide range of activities --
economic, political and social. As the state's role was gradually subsumed by functional 
arrangements proponents posited that the process would reduce the dependence of the 
individual on the state. This would mark a gradual shift in loyalties of individuals, away from 
the nation-state, toward the functional international institutions that satisfied the welfare needs 
of the individual. The end result envisioned was a significant reduction of the state's political 
function and authority. 
Functionalism seeks to re-establish the links between people on a sub-national level. That is to 
say, people connect with one another on the basis of common occupational activity, 
transcending the nation-state boundary in the process. For Ernst Haas this reflects the Guild 
Socialist heritage. He suggests that "pre-industrial" and "pre-national" occupational groups 
were the true focal points for human wellbeing. This changed only after the birth of the 
territorially-bounded nation-state. For Haas, this curtailed people's tendency to identifY with 
their occupational colleagues. It signaled the hegemony of the "unnatural state" over "natural 
society,,86 In similar vein, David Mitrany adds, "Our social activities are cut off arbitrarily at 











the limit of the state and, if at all, are allowed to be linked to the same activities across the 
border only by means of uncertain and cramping politicalligatures.,,87 
It is possible to discern certain distinct strands of political theory that are reflected in 
Functionalism. Pragmatism has been important to Functionalism Functionalists deliberately 
avoid a constitutional approach to integration, relying instead on an incremental building 
process that will eventually result in integration across all domains. In Haas' language: "Step-
by-step schemes of material cooperation, evolving in an unplanned fashion, will eventually 
work themselves out in the direction of a worldwide system of cooperation, for which a 
constitution will merely be a symbolic crown, recognizing officially what has been true in fact 
for some time.,,88 Utilitarianism is reflected in Functionalism Functionalists suggest that 
people will cooperate with one another in order to maximize their own physical welfare. 
Functionalists believe that group conflict is not an inevitability. Conflict can be creatively 
transcended by placing emphasis not on reconciliation of interests but on their integration. 
Thus, "politics need not be envisaged as the crude clash of interests, each rationally conceived 
and defended, but may yield to problem-solving. ,,89 
Functionalist Propositions 
Functionalism sees as unrealistic and undesirable the aspiration of creating a supreme political 
authority. Instead, an ever-widening network of task-oriented sub-state agencies would 
eventually subsume the responsibilities presently associated with governments. Functionalists 
suggest that since certain individuals and groupings within different societies already share 
certain aims, the process of forging functional1inks could be ignited without significant 
87 David Mitrany, (1943), A Working Peace System, London: Royal Institute ofInternational Affairs, p. 42. 











political friction. For Mitrany, this would lead to a logic whereby "[n]ational problems would 
then appear, and would be treated, as what they are, the local segments of general 
problems.,,9o 
For Functionalists, the ultimate goal of integration is the evolution of an international 
community increasingly tied together by functional interactions. This, however, does not 
presuppose the end of the nation state. The Functionalists approach emphasizes the primacy 
of political and economic variables. In the case of the former, successful integration is 
determined by the will of political elites to seek certain positive outcomes. Where the stress is 
on economic variables, the view is that the economy generates certain demands and pressures 
on political institutions which compels political elites to adopt creative techniques and 
strategies which lead to more integrated communities. Functionalism is dynamic in that it 
does not specify a structural blueprint for integration. Instead, it proposes incremental 
structural integration based on the convergence of interests. 
Functionalists believe that if nations take full advantage of what are at first converging 
technical interests, eventually these interests become fused. Making this point, Edgar Saveney 
commented, "In the end the nations would find themselves federated, after a fashion, by the 
very force of things. ,,91 Implicit is the suggestion that once functional relationships have been 
identified and established a process of change towards more pervasive integration 
commences. Thus, the dilution of nationalism and sovereignty is not an explicit Functionalist 
project, but becomes an incremental and natural process grounded in initial forging of 
functional links. 
89 Haas (1964), p. 20. 
90 David Mitrany (1943), p. 42. 
91 Edgar Saveney in Harold E. Engle, (1957), "A Critical Study ofthe Functionalist Approach to International 











F or Functionalists traditional diplomacy or the resolution of issues at the political level 
hampers integrative efforts. They maintain that it is more important to identify what is 
technically the most feasible approach to a common aim rather than consideration of what 
will best satisfy national interests. In other words, the technical must be separated from the 
political. Such a thing is only possible at sub-national level. Thus, the identification and 
establishment of functional links begins below the level of government. Finally, 
Functionalism stresses that the discernment of functional areas of cooperation must be 
narrowly defined. Broad programs often end up hamstrung by unforeseen eventualities. Haas 
suggests that, "organizational programs tied to the totality of all aspects of all national foreign 
policies never seem to enjoy implementation, whereas well-defined narrow programs 
conforming to parts of policies or certain states fare much better. In short, we can say that 
functionally specific international programs, if organizationally separated from diffuse 
orientations, maximize both welfare and integration. ,,92 
Pivotal Role of Interest Politics 
Theory of interest politics is central to Functionalism in that it provides the explanatory link 
between fostered functional connections and the eventual emergence of integrated 
communities. A broad conception of interest views it as every demand articulated by a group 
in society that enters the arena of political competition. That is to say, any demand based on 
the values and priorities of a particular group represents an interest, even where these 
demands fall into substantively different areas environmental considerations, religious 
education, minority rights, etc. A narrower, economic perception of interest equates 











specifically to economic claims and demands. The tacit implication is that the negotiation and 
balance of opposing economic interest would approach the general economic good. 
The theory of interest politics elevates the individuaL The common good is achieved where 
the individual has the opportunity to satisfy his/her interests.93 The theory proposes that 
individual actors and groups engage in political pursuits for self-serving reasons. All political 
action is intimately connected to individual or group perception of interest. The theory of 
interest politics rejects the notion of a natural harmony of interests grounded in purposive or 
calculated behavior. Neither does it subscribe to the notion of conscience, good will or 
dedication to the common good. Where cooperation is achieved it is based on the convergence 
of separate perceptions of interest. Haas writes of interest politics and Functionalism: "there is 
no common good other than that perceived through the interest-tinted lenses worn by 
international actors. But international interest politics causes the tinting to fall into converging 
patterns, and Functionalism sensitizes us to spotting the tasks responsible for the pattern.,,94 
Thus, Functionalists maintain that even though actors may not explicitly work towards 
integration because their perceptions of interest do not coincide, nonetheless, certain kinds of 
organizational tasks will lead to integration. Integration may be born out of "unwilled," 
separate demands and claims of different actors. Therefore, for Functionalists integration 
results from the pursuit of interests within existing international organizations. 
93 This runs contrary to the idealistic Wilsonian notion that peace and cooperation flow from a common 
dedication to a common good. 











N eo-Functionalist Modifications 
Early European efforts of integration in the 1950s and 1960s, as well as the establishment of 
the United Nations, signaled the reformulation of Functionalist thinking. The emerging 'neo-
functionalist' scholars aspired to reconstitute Functionalism to better reflect international 
political and economic realities; and, specifically to apply Functionalist ideas to the 
integration experiences of Western Europe. 
A number of commonalties between Functionalism and neo-Functionalism exist. Both elevate 
economic and political variables and afford a central role to experts (technocrats)95 Of these 
commonalties Jeggan Senghor writes, "(n]eo-functionalism has, in common with 
functionalism, an acceptance of the determining nature of the economic, social and 
technological environment, an emphasis on economic welfare and technical cooperation, a 
stress on utilitarian factors in community-building and a belief in a liberal pluralistic social 
setting in participating units ... In all these areas, neo-functionalists elaborated and expanded 
on functionalist thinking.,,96 
Three characteristics are identified as distinctive to neo-Functionalism. First, for neo-
functionalists the variables deemed necessary for integration are: industrialized economies 
involved in international trade; and, democratic mode of governance across integrating units, 
with politically mobilized masses participating in political processes through interest groups 
and parties. In other words, neo-functionalists identify Liberal Democracy, with its twin 
pillars of liberal politics and free-market economics, as necessary for integration. Second, 
95 The distinction between experts and politicians is implicit in most functionalist writing. The expert is 
concerned with doing practical tasks; whilst the politician is occupied with doctrine and ideology. 
96 Jeggan C. Senghor, in Anyang' Nyong'o, ed., (1990), Regional Integration In Africa: Unfinished Agenda, 











great emphasis is placed on the importance of loyalty in the integration process. The 
wellspring of that loyalty is either a measure of political or social homogeneity, or the product 
of successful transnational institutions. Third, the concept of spillover is critical to neo-
functionalism. Successful functional linkages in one sphere have a spillover effect, generating 
impetus and momentum for further identification and development of functional links in a 
variety of areas, eventually resulting in integration. Furthermore, for neo-functionalists 
spillover usually flows from a functionally specific economic area to a less technical (and 
often more controversial) political area. 
Functionalism's Adaptability 
Even though Functional Theory has largely treated the European integration experience, 
certain fundamental tenets are able to travel to Africa. The power of Functionalism lies in the 
fact that it is not a rigid explanatory system. It is both malleable and adaptable. Three 
principles stand out as we assess the possibility of drawing on Functionalism to facilitate 
cooperation and integration in Africa. 
First and foremost, Functionalism avoids a constitutional approach to integration, relying 
instead on a gradual and incremental building process that will eventually result in 
cooperation and integration across political and economic domains. The abysmal record of 
African integration initiatives to date is surely evidence that constitutional approaches have 
largely failed. A re-orientation that gives primacy to the discernment and development of 











Secondly, Functionalism stresses a separation of the technical and the political. It privileges 
the expert over the politician. The principal impediment to integration initiatives on the 
African continent has been the inability to generate the necessary political will at the highest 
levels. Lessons from past endeavors illustrate this time and time again. For example, the East 
African Community, despite certain important advantages (common languages in English and 
Swahili, as well as common educational background of many politicians and civil servants in 
Makerere University), faded and died from lack of interest in keeping it alive. 97 By 
empowering experts to create ever-widening, task-oriented, sub-state agencies to facilitate 
cooperation in different areas, the political obstacle may be partially circumnavigated. 
Third, the principle of interest politics, as the engine of the functionalist process, must be 
carefully considered in the African context. Functionalism stresses the tension between 
interest politics and notions of conscience, good will and common good. Cooperation is not 
contingent on these sentiments, rather it is achieved via the convergence of separate 
perceptions of interest. Given certain problems unique to the African context such as acute 
external dependence and marked differences in economic capacity of different African states 
(both to be explored further in a subsequent section), this understanding of interest politics 
must be tempered. For Functionalism to be viable in Africa there needs to exist not only 
terrain for mutually beneficial cooperation, but an ethos of good will and notion of a common 
good. The three broad principles outlined above, together with the idea of spillover and 
loyalty to the integration process, are the ingredients for rendering Functionalism viable in the 
African context. 
97 See: Arthur Hazlewood, "The End of the East African Community: What are the Lessons for Regional 











6. DRAWING FROM THE EUROPEAN EXPERIENCE 
Needless to say, the African regionalism problematic presents unique peculiarities. The mix 
of political, economic, cultural and social factors in Africa do not approximate conditions in 
other areas of the globe. As such, it is widely recognized that a 'lock-stock-and-barrel' 
approach to regional integration is inappropriate. That is to say, for Africa to adopt a 
European, Latin American or Asian blueprint for integration would almost certainly be an 
exercise in futility. However, not to draw on the experiences of similar efforts elsewhere 
would be equally foolhardy. Given Europe's success, this section briefly examines that 
region's integration initiative. 
Europe's experience with integration began shortly after World War II with the realization of 
the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC). The effort was essentially a 
political initiative to eliminate some of the divisions and particularisms that had characterized 
political and economic relations between European states in the immediate post-war period. 
The functional inception of integration in Europe was the formation of the European Coal and 
Steel Community (ECSC) in 1951. The initiative aspired to pool the coal and steel resources 
ofthe six member states. The achievement was an unlikely, almost impossible, coup for 
integration; because, once ratified by the parliaments concerned the legislation placed the coal 
and steel industries of the respective countries under a supranational High Authority. Once 
this had been achieved energies were directed towards conceiving other supra-national bodies 
which would integrate, one by one, important branches of industry of the countries 
concemed.98 The success of the ECSC proved difficult to replicate. Given the extreme 
98 This sector-by-sector approach was an alternative to the common-market approach to integration, upon which 











agricultural protectionism in Europe it was hardly surprising that the "green pool,,99 initiative 
that sought to integrate agriculture sectors met with little success. The European Defense 
Community (EDC), pushed by leading protagonist of European Federation using the climate 
generated by the Korean War as momentum, also eventually faltered and collapsed. Given 
this failure in particular, the statesmen of Little Europe once again focused their energies on 
the economic approach to integration with emphasis on the creation of a common market. It 
came as a welcome re-orientation for those with a liberal outlook, as Michael Heilperin points 
out: "For a liberal, there was much danger in such an approach, for its eventual outcome could 
hardly fail to be either chaos or superstate planning on an unprecedented scale, a boon to 
economic planners and state Socialists of the countries concerned, but a danger to the liberal 
pattern of international economic relations."loo 
It was Holland, in 1952, which pushed most vociferously for the establishment of free trade 
among the six nations of the ECSC. Economic Europe was seen as a precursor to Political 
Europe. A gradual process of reducing and eliminating trade restrictions to be supervised by a 
supra-national body combining all six of the ECSC states was envisioned. J.W. Beyen, 
Foreign Minister of the Netherlands, in a 1956 presentation titled, "Progress Towards a New 
Europe as Viewed by a Dutchman," articulated the Dutch government's broad position: "in 
order to make the Political Community of the Six truly viable, it was necessary to entrust it, 
from its very inception, with the task of the economic integration of Europe and this, of 
course, not by sectors of production but what might be called horizontal integration-
through the establishment of a general common market." 10 I This marked the adoption of a 
unified policy direction. Experts advised that integration by sectors (that is, through the 
admission of successive sectors) would be impossible. A gradual approach characterized by a 
99 See: Michael A. Heilperin, in C. Grove Haines, ed., (1957), p. 125. 











progressive suppression of all the obstacles and adjustments of legislation would arrive at a 
customs union and eventually a joint market. 
In Europe, as long as the politicians decided in the early years of integration not to emphasize 
the creation of political Europe and instead to focus on economic integration, the functional 
and associational approaches to economic integration were able not only to coexist, but to 
mutually reinforce one another. The OEEC (an 'associational' grouping) helped ECSC (a 
functional initiative) and vice versa. For example, the operation of the ECSC may not have 
been possible were it not for the system of the European Payments Union and the 
liberalization of trade pushed for by the OEEC. Conversely, the existence ofthe coal and steel 
pool greatly aided the OEEC. In addition, the spirit of emulation and rivalry that existed 
between the two groupings provided impetus for both. 102 
Turning specifically to Europe's experience with customs union and the common market, 
there are several points to be highlighted. The Benelux experience demonstrates that the 
establishment of a customs union can be achieved without any supranational authority to 
administer it; that there is no need for prior harmonization of social policies of the members 
of the customs union; and, that the success of the union depends on each member sorting out 
domestic monetary issues, i.e. making sure that it maintains realistic exchange rates with its 
partners and the outside world. The record indicates that the harmonization of working 
conditions, labor regulations, transport laws, credits, etc, would facilitate the successful 
establishment of a common market, but that this can be achieved without prior uniformization 
and equalization of conditions. Above all, it must be recognized that even under the most 
favourable circumstances the process will take time, and sacrifices, both in political and 
101 J.W. Beyen, as quoted in: C. Grove Haines, ed., (1957), p. 130. 











economic tenns, must be made. As Heilperin writes, 
Experience as well as logic tend to show that there can be no integration, 
economic or otherwise, without paying the price. In political terms, the price 
is the surrender of some parts of national sovereignty; in economic terms, he 
price is the surrender of economic nationalism. Integration without tears is a 
mirage of wishful thinking. It does not follow that the tears must be bitter 
and the transitional hardships unendurable.103 
The European case highlights the critical importance of negotiating a balance between 
political initiative and functional viability. As numerous integration initiatives in Africa show, 
outright political solutions are often hamstrung, COMESA being a case in point. The 
Common Market of Eastern and Southern Africa, with its elaborate and far-reaching treaty 
and established institutions, still remains a largely lifeless arrangement. The treaty seems too 
broad and requires its members to relinquish too much of their sovereignty too quickly, for 
whole hearted and genuine participation. The broader lesson from the European experience is 
that a 'straitjacket' approach to integration, that is, the uncompromising adoption of a single 
fonn or methodology for integration, is perhaps detrimental. Europe negotiated a balance 
between functional and associational strategies. African initiatives must also be dynamic 
enough to take advantage of various strategies and methodologies, but must ultimately discern 
and negotiate their own balance between functional links and broader political initiative. 
African integration, must in a sense, be a burning of the candle at both ends. That is, regional 
integration needs to be approached simultaneously from above (macro-political level) and 
from below (level of functional connections). 











7. PROSPECTS, PRESCRIPTIONS AND POSSIBILITIES 
Proceeding on the conviction that future prospects for more successful regional integration do 
exist, the question becomes: What type of framework or design will be suited to African 
conditions? This paper argues for a functional orientation as prerequisite to more effective 
regional integration. If Functionalism is the necessary theoretical framework for regional 
integration on the continent, then the establishment of an African Free Trade Area marks the 
best opportunity for animating functional theory. This section explores the idea of an African 
Free Trade Area (AFTA) as a more realistic integration design. 
An African Free Trade Area 
The idea of an African free Trade Area (AFTA) is to suppress tariffs and minimize 
quantitative restrictions among member states. An African Common Market implies the 
elimination of trade tariffs as well as the suppression of all barriers on "commodity and factor 
movement with some degree of harmonization of national economic policies". 104 It is clear 
that the idea of an AFT A is a far less ambitious project. Accordingly, it has a far more 
realistic chance of success. AFTA is not an end in itself, but a means to an end more 
pervasive political and economic integration of the continent. It can be a stepping stone to the 
creation of a Common Market, or an alternative to it. A free trade area in its framework and 
stipulations is compatible with and amenable to a functional orientation precisely because it is 
less rigorous in its demands on members. That is, it would require fewer structural, economic 
and administrative adjustments of its member states. AFT A would have a relatively narrowly 
defined agenda - the principal focus of free trade is to ensure the systematic reduction of trade 
barriers. As such, AFTA, unlike ACM, does not require a sudden jump to supranationality. 











One of the principle impediments to the successful establishment of ACM specifically, and 
regional integration initiatives in general, has been the necessity for members to relinquish 
aspects of national sovereignty far too comprehensively and rapidly than they have been 
prepared to. Thus, "ACM could by constitutional arrangements adopt radical measures 
towards an autonomous development in the region, without allowing for enough time for 
member states to orientate themselves fully to the integration process."I05 
Both the Latin American Free Trade Association (LAFTA)106 and the European Free Trade 
Association (EFTA) are precedents that are instructive for an African initiative. Upon its 
inception in 1960, EFTA outlined four broad objectivesJ07: 
1. to promote in the area of the association and in each member state a sustained expansion 
of economic activity, full employment, increased productivity and the rational use of 
resources, financial stability and continuous improvement in living standards; 
2. to secure that trade between member states takes place in conditions of fair competition; 
3. to avoid significant disparity between member states in the conditions of supply of raw 
materials produced within the area of association; and 
4. to contribute to the harmonious development and expansion of world trade and to the 
progressive removal of barriers to it. 
Clearly, given the unique African context these objectives are not directly transferable. 
However, the underlying principles that they speak to - trade liberalization measures, fair 
105 Ralph I. Onwuka, in Onwuka and Sesay, eds., (1992), p. 71. 
106 Created in 1961 by the Treaty of Montevideo. See: Sidney Dell, (1966), A Latin American Common Market?, 
London: Oxford University Press. 











competition and principles of reciprocity, and cooperative economic/industrial ventures are 
directly relevant to the establishment of a viable African Free Trade Area. 
In the area of trade liberalization (and again drawing on the EFTA experience), member states 
would at a minimum have to reach agreement on the following issues: (i) institutional 
arrangements, (ii) the necessary transitional period, (iii) the rules of origin, (iv) margin of 
preference to be granted, (v) method of sharing benefits, and (vi) reciprocity of benefits. 108 
Extenuating economic circumstances would be taken into consideration by granting certain 
concessions to less developed countries. 
The establishment of cooperative industrial/economic ventures would be determined by 
identifying areas of functional complementarity. This would include such domains as energy, 
telecommunications and transportation; involving projects such as the construction of 
integrated road, rail and maritime transport systems, as well as development of hydro-electric 
capacities, and river and lake basins for improved agricultural production. Discernment of 
functional relationships would facilitate inter-country specialization in cooperative ventures. 
Reciprocity denotes the granting of preferential treatment to a party by another on the 
understanding that such a concession wi1l1ater be reciprocated. If functional arrangements are 
predicated upon mutually agree incentives, then the principle of reciprocity underpins 
functionalism. Functionalism and reciprocity facilitate trade within a free trade area, and can 
promote balanced industrial growth. 












1brough AFTA every state would maintain its sovereign political rights. A gradual reduction 
of trade barriers would be achieved through committees, meetings and schedules. In LAFT A, 
for example, there are committees on customs, trade, agricultural review and budget, who 
assist and advise a central council in their respective functional areas. Government advisory 
committees treat questions of transportation, definition of origin, industrial development, and 
customs and monetary questions. 
The role of regional financial institutions (East African Development Bank, Development 
bank of West Africa, The West African Development Bank, Development Bank of the Great 
Lakes) together with the African Development Bank, is to "strengthen the monetary base of 
the area and ensure that the available capital is rationally and equitably utilized". 109 These 
institutions will finance development projects, facilitate monetary transactions, and establish 
provisions for compensating less developed members of AFT A. For Dell, such institutions, 
alongside Central banks of member countries, would be responsible for creating "systems of 
compensation and payments so as to break down current payments barriers on inter-African 
trade".llo 
Addressing Acute Disparities 
The critical problems of external linkages and dependencies, uneven development, and 
complex rules of origin that have debilitated efforts to establish an ACM are better addressed 
within the framework of AFTA. The key lies in AFTA's flexibility, enabling it to better 
negotiate the political volatility of the African continent. Under AFT A problems that arise are 
109 Ralph 1. Onwuka, in Onwuka and Sesay, eds., (1992), p. 68. 











dealt with in a functional and gradual manner, rather than a rigidly constitutional and 
supranational way. 
Transnational corporations (TNCs) are the primary benefactors of the external linkages and 
dependencies that are a legacy of colonialism, and the debilitating shortage of capital and 
technology on the continent. There is a critical need to harmonize the national policies that 
direct and regulate the activities ofTNCs on the continent. Presently these corporations are 
able to navigate the African political-economic terrain offsetting one government against 
another to derive maximum benefits (tax holidays, duty-free import privileges, and cheap raw 
materials). They are readily able to exploit the low levels of domestic production that make 
direct foreign investment an absolutely critical lifeline. African countries must distinguish 
areas exclusively for African enterprises, as well as areas of joint ventures between 
indigenous and foreign enterprises. Cooperation under an arrangement such as AFT A would 
facilitate cooperation between African countries that will nurture, and where necessary, 
protect and privilege African enterprises. By planning and coordinating cooperative ventures 
with foreign enterprises, AFT A will be in position to offer a measure of security and a fair 
return on their investment, but at the same time ensure that the main gains from that 
investment remain and are re-deployed in the region. Thus, the AFTA members must, within 
the framework of AFTA itself, make an attempt to define an economic policy that, if not joint, 
will at least be coherent. 
Uneven development is a critical problem. The gains of a free trade area should be focused on 
generating even development. Special dispensation should be given to the least developed 
African states in order to aid them in enhancing productive capacities. This could take the 











prepared to make certain sacrifices. For example, provisions could be made for weaker states 
to be permitted to reduce import duties and other trade restrictions at a slower pace than 
stronger members. As unrealistic as it may sound that political will for such sacrifice could be 
generated, it is not unprecedented. The Treaty of Montevideo J I J quite successfully made such 
provisions for Bolivia, Ecuador and Paraguay. 
A third pressing consideration is the necessity of an extensive and well-defined schema 
governing 'rules of origin'. Rules of origin are necessary to determine which goods have 
undergone certain production processes on the continent and are consequently to be privileged 
by tariff reductions. Goods that do not wholly or substantially originate from the continent are 
ineligible. Also necessary would be the designation of a 'process rule' that defines the nature 
and content of goods qualifying for preferential tariff treatment. Finally, a 'percentage 
criterion' would ensure that non-AFTA materials would not exceed a certain percentage (e.g. 
fifty percent) of the goods' export price. 
• •• 
Past experiences must become instructive. An understanding of failures must inform future 
formulations. Experience indicates that Market integration, however desirable, is a lofty and 
unrealistic goal given present circumstances and conditions. African interest will be better 
served by abandoning market integration strategies and focusing more seriously on an 
approach that will broaden the regional production base. The idea of an African Free Trade 
Area allows for this strategy re-orientation. State-led development of key sectors such as steel 
and cement, for example, can force the pace of regional integration. This can be achieved by 











giving priority to regional investment in heavy industry, transport and communications 
infrastructure. Efficient channels of communication are a prerequisite to effective domestic 
economic development, and to regional economic cooperation. African countries must invest 
more in developing the necessary communications infrastructure. Regional cooperation 
efforts have been greatly hampered by transport and telecommunications bottlenecks. 
At this time African political and economic realities are eminently unsuited to a 
comprehensive, continental approach to integration. The administrative capacity, institutional 
resources and political will required for such an effort do not presently exit on the continent. 
A functional and incremental approach is a more realistic and pragmatic paradigm. Under 
present conditions cooperative initiatives are more likely to be successful if they are less 
ambitious. Bilateral or multilateral cooperation, on specific, 'non-controversial' projects and 
programs, in areas such as postal and transport infrastructure, and transfer, adaptation and 
development of technologies, seems to be a more viable starting point. Rather than elaborate 
long-term planning, efforts should initially be based on immediate, common economic 
interests. A functional orientation marks a shift from a 'blue-print approach', towards a 
'learning-process approach' (to borrow from the contemporary Development Administration 
lexicon). A blue-print approach involves the design of a specific program and plan of action 
for development. It has come under criticism because it is inflexible and often unable to 
respond to changing circumstances. On the other hand, the learning-process approach is fairly 
open-ended. It enables administrators to adapt to changing environments and make 
adjustments during the development process. Regional cooperation must be approached with 
a similar flexibility. Cooperation based on discernement and establishment of specific and 











The proliferation of organizations of regional cooperation and integration must be curtailed. 
The most prominent existing organizations SADC, UAM, ECOW AS, PTA, and CEEAC ~­
must be reformed to become leaner, more streamlined and efficient institutions. This may 
necessitate steps of focusing their mandates more sharply on the regional exchange of goods 
and services, labor and capital. If functionalism is to become the theoretical antecedent of 
regional integration initiatives, what is to be the fate of regional arrangements such as 
ECQWAS, which aspire to a more comprehensive, less gradual approach? To call for their 
dissolution would be both unrealistic and detrimental. However, are-formulation of their 













The underlying premise of this research is that a rigorous understanding of African 
development must be grounded in an understanding of the dynamics of the international 
system. Consequently, the point of departure of this paper is the interrogation of the concept 
of globalization, which is seen as the dominant force shaping the international system and 
. 
global order at the beginning of the Twenty-first century. The paper concerned itself with 
understanding the ways in which scholars are conceiving the concept of globalization, 
determining the ways in which the phenomenon is impacting the international system, and 
discerning globalization's impact on political and economic outcomes in Africa. The paper 
argues that globalization is driving the establishment of a global free market capitalist 
economic system based on competition, efficiency and productivity. This emerging 
international political economic order increasingly favours economies of scale and collective 
capacity. That is, its organizational logic is such that only those competitors who can rapidly 
mobilize and deploy vast resources will be able to compete effectively in the system. 
Accordingly, the wealthy areas of the globe are organizing themselves into increasingly 
cohesive economic and political regional groupings. Furthermore, globalization is speeding 
the inclusion of poorer countries into this fiercely competitive market. However, the terms of 
inclusion are dictated by and in favor of the wealthiest and most powerful members of the 
international society. 
Based on this reading of international life the paper argues that more pervasive cooperation 
and integration is ultimately the continent's only viable development strategy in the face of 











in order to compete more effectively in the emerging international political economy. African 
regionalism is examined in historical perspective - an assessment of past initiatives, which it 
is now clear have largely faltered, yields the conclusion that a fundamental strategic re-
orientation is required. The constitutional, 'grand-strategy' approach to integration must give 
way to an orientation that emphasizes more functional economic connections below the level 
of the state. In its final analysis this paper advocates the gradual and incremental enlargement 
of the area of cooperation across political and economic domains within and across regions on 
a functional basis. The establishment of an African Free Trade Area is viewed as the most 
effective framework for animating a functional orientation. An African Free Trade Area 
affords member states far greater maneuverability than an African Common Market, which 
has, for the past twenty-five years been the dominant vision of Africa's leadership. The dream 
of an African Common Market has quite simply been a case of trying to run before one can 
walk Political and social structures in African countries are indeed too weak and unstable for 
an African Common Market to be a realistic aspiration at this time. 
The only way in which the African continent may hope to influence the world order that is 
emerging is by "turning inwards" to treat seriously its own malaise. The life threatening crises 
that most African states face must be treated with new and genuine commitment from African 
leaders. Attainment of self-sustainable development requires bold new initiatives grounded in 
a fundamental understanding of the international system in which African countries must 
learn to operate. Turning inwards does not imply isolation from the international system. 
Given the nature, character, and scope of globalization, withdrawal is not possible. An inward 
orientation implies a fundamental commitment to the creation of development strategies that 
are sensitive to specific cultural, political, economic and social contexts. It moves away from 











Western experiences. To date Africa has largely attempted to put into practice the model used 
by the European Community, without adequate consideration or appreciation for unique 
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